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US embassy cables: Gates warns of war with Iran

  1. In a meeting in Rome with the Italian foreign minister, US defence secretary, Robert Gates, warns that something must happen soon to break the Iran nuclear stalemate if another war in the Middle East is to be avoided. If Iran acquires nuclear weapons, it will be a different world in five years' time, Gates says. Key passage highlighted in yellow.

  2. Read related article
Friday, 12 February 2010, 13:18
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ROME 000173
EO 12958 DECL: 02/11/2020
ROME 00000173 001.2 OF 003
Classified By: Ambassador Alexander Vershbow for Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D )

1. (S/NF) SUMMARY: Secretary of Defense Robert Gates (SecDef) met with Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs Franco Frattini during an official visit to Rome on February 8. On Afghanistan, Frattini was eager to move beyond the London Conference and work to produce practical results for the Afghan people. He proposed better civil-military coordination at senior levels in NATO, and raised the prospect of coordination on local projects across the Afghanistan-Iran border. SecDef thanked Frattini for Italy's pledge of more troops for operations in Afghanistan and explained where gaps in civil-military cooperation existed. Frattini believed the international community was lining up against Iran, and encouraged better coordination with countries outside the P5-plus-1. SecDef warned that a nuclear Iran would lead to greater proliferation in the Middle East, war, or both. SecDef agreed with Frattini that a United Nations conference highlighting security challenges in the Horn of Africa was a good idea. END SUMMARY.




2. (S/NF) Frattini opened by telling SecDef that the U.S. can count on Italy's full support on Afghanistan, Iran and fighting terror. He had recently talked with General Jones and Secretary Clinton and relayed the same message. He expressed a desire to focus on the comprehensive approach in such a way to improve the daily lives of Afghans. He asserted a need to press President Karzai on delivering improved governance or risk losing support for the mission in coalition Parliaments. Frattini wanted to get beyond "just talking" -- referencing the London conference -- and noted concrete Italian projects to convert poppy cultivation to olive oil production and to create a national high school for public administration.

3. (S/NF) SecDef commended Rome's efforts to increase Italian contributions, asking whether even more Carabinieri might be available for training the Afghan security forces. He observed that General McChrystal's emphasis on protecting Afghan civilians has changed attitudes among Allied publics. SecDef said he is pushing the comprehensive approach, noting a need for all stakeholders in Afghanistan to share information effectively. He said he hoped that NATO's new Senior Civilian Representative, Ambassador Mark Sedwill, could facilitate this. SecDef recommended a focus on better governance below the level of the national government -- which would take decades to turn into a modern government ) taking advantage of traditional institutions and competent governors at the regional and sub-regional levels and leveraging them into local success stories. At the national level, however, our priority should be to develop those ministries most critical to our success, such as Defense, Interior, Finance, Agriculture, and Health. Noting Gen. McChrystal's recent statement that the situation in Afghanistan is no longer deteriorating, SecDef said that much of the challenge is psychological -- convincing Afghans that we can win and that we will not abandon them.

4. (S/NF) Frattini agreed that civilian-military integration is the weakest part of the Afghan strategy. He expressed frustration that NATO foreign ministers only discuss issues like agriculture and education while defense ministers only discuss security. The problem, Frattini suggested, is that they don't talk to each other. He proposed a joint meeting of foreign and defense ministers, beginning with talks at the expert level. SecDef responded that Gen. McChrystal and Ambassador Eikenberry do civilian-military collaboration at the national level on the basis of a Joint Campaign Plan, as do local ground commanders with leaders of PRTs. What is missing is the level in between -- the regional commands -- and SecDef expressed a desire for Sedwill to appoint subordinates to address this in each RC, building on the

ROME 00000173 002.2 OF 003

example of the civ-mil cell in RC-South. The effect would be cascading civil-military coordination at the national, regional, and local levels. SecDef noted that similar efforts by UNSRSG Kai Eide had been hamstrung by resourcing and the UN's aversion to working with the military. As a NATO representative, Sedwill should not have these problems.

5. (S/NF) Frattini also asked about practical cooperation across the Afghan-Iranian border. Local incentives for cooperation might undermine weapons and drug trafficking and help co-opt reconcilable Taliban. SecDef noted that Iran is playing both sides of the street -- trying to be friendly with the Afghanistan government while trying to undermine ISAF efforts. He noted that intelligence indicated there was little lethal material crossing the Afghanistan-Iran border. SecDef suggested that trade route protection from Afghanistan into Eastern Iran, which is important for local economies on both sides of the border, might be a place to start. SecDef noted that any effort will need to be coordinated with Kabul. Frattini agreed this would be a good starting point.




6. (S/NF) Frattini supported recent public statements by SecDef raising the pressure on Iran. He declared that Ahmadinejad cannot be trusted, especially after contradicting recent constructive statements by his own government. Frattini, citing a recent conversation with Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov, said he believed Russia would support the sanctions track. The challenge was to bring China on board; China and India, in Frattini's view, were critical to the adoption of measures that would affect the government without hurting Iranian civil society. He also specifically proposed including Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Brazil, Venezuela and Egypt in the conversation. He expressed particular frustration with Ankara's "double game" of outreach to both Europe and Iran. Frattini proposed an informal meeting of Middle East countries, who were keen to be consulted on Iran, and noted that Secretary Clinton was in agreement.

7. (S/NF) SecDef emphasized that a UNSC resolution was important because it would give the European Union and nations a legal platform on which to impose even harsher sanctions against Iran. SecDef pointedly warned that urgent action is required. Without progress in the next few months, we risk nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, war prompted by an Israeli strike, or both. SecDef predicted "a different world" in 4-5 years if Iran developed nuclear weapons. SecDef stated that he recently delivered the same warning to PM Erdogan, and he agreed with Frattini's assessment on Saudi Arabia and China, noting that Saudi Arabia is more important to both Beijing and Moscow than Iran.

8. (S/NF) SecDef urged Frattini to reconsider a planned visit to Italy by a prominent Iranian Parliamentarian in the wake of recent executions of students in opposition to the government. At the same time, we needed to ensure we did not discredit the opposition by creating the impression that they are the tools of foreign partners.


Horn of Africa


9. (C) Frattini expressed concern about deteriorating conditions in Somalia and Yemen. He noted a recent conversation with President Sharif of Somalia's Transitional Federal Government (TFG), in which Sharif said that he would be unable to pay his security forces by the end of February. Frattini said that Italy was encouraging the EU Presidency to focus on Somalia and Yemen, and had proposed a United Nations conference addressing Horn of Africa security issues. Italy was providing funding to the TFG's national budget. SecDef concurred that the region deserved more focus.

ROME 00000173 003.2 OF 003

10. (U) SecDef has cleared this cable. Drafted by OSD staff. DIBBLE

US embassy cables: Emirati crown prince broaches invasion of Iran

  1. Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed hosts top officials for a weekly forum on regional issues. He is ominous about the Iran nuclear crisis, at one point declaring that it would take an invasion of ground forces to eradicate Iran's nuclear installations. Key passage highlighted in yellow.Read related article
Monday, 16 May 2005, 09:12
EO 12958 DECL: 05/16/2015
Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison. For reasons 1.4 (a), (b), and (d).

1. (U) Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed,s weekly Sunday "VIP Majlis" provided an excellent opportunity for a visiting National Defense University delegation to observe first-hand the UAEG,s informal consultative process. MbZ, brothers MinState Foreign Affairs Sheikh Hamdan and Interior Minister Sheikh Saif, and Labor Minister al Ka'abi were joined by several dozen prominent Abu Dhabi officials and businessmen for the weekly gathering at Bateen Palace.



2. (U) NDU President Lt. Gen. Dunn and National War College Deputy Commandant Ambassador Wahba briefed MbZ on several new NDU initiatives, including opportunities for UAE students in the Information Resources Management College program, which emphasizes threats, vulnerabilities, and risks in a net-centric environment. Ambassador Sison praised the UAE's selection of NDU candidates, noting that several were serving in key positions today: GHQ Armed Forces Deputy Chief of Staff MG Mohammed Hilal al-Kaabi, GHQ Director of General Procurement Obaid Al Ketbi, Deputy Commander UAE Air Force Brigadier Ali, and MbZ's aide Yousef al Otaiba had all benefited from NDU programs.



3. (C) Ambassador Sison noted that day's visit to Iraq by Secretary Rice, highlighting the Secretary's encouragement

SIPDIS for continued momentum in the political process and her meetings with PM al-Jaafari and KDP leader Barzani. MbZ voiced disdain for al-Jaafari, citing (again) his concerns over the Prime Minister's ties to Iran. These concerns were aimed at Jaafari's Dawaa Party colleagues, as well. While agreeing that it was important for Iraq's Sunni Arabs to be more involved in the political process and in drafting the constitution, MbZ complained that "there wasn't one worthwhile Sunni" on the scene. He criticized new Sunni Defense Minister Dulaimi as being "in it for himself." Nor did MbZ have anything good to say about former Iraqi Finance Minister Mahdi's nomination as one of two Vice Presidents, complaining that Mahdi "did not work for the people of Iraq." Nonetheless, MbZ said he agreed with the USG's efforts to encourage the various Iraqi factions to work together. The UAE would continue to help train Iraqi police forces at the UAE's police academy in Al Ain and provide reconstruction assistance. It was important for the region as a whole that the U.S. and its allies "got it right" in Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt, he underscored. (Note: MbZ aide Yousef al Otaiba had a few days earlier shared with Ambassador concerns passed by former PM Allawi that Dulaimi was "devious," "bad news," "very close" to Iranian intelligence, and had been introduced to the Iranians by Chalabi. Yousef had also noted the UAEG,s impression Mahdi had not always been a "team player" in the government of former PM Allawi. End note.)



4. (S) Turning to Iran, MbZ voiced certainty that the EU-3 efforts with Iran would break down and that Iran would resume its nuclear activities ) if it had not already done so. Repeating concerns first voiced to us in February (reftel), MbZ appeared convinced that it was only a matter of time before Israel or the U.S. would strike Iranian nuclear facility targets. U.S. installations in the Gulf could be targeted by Iran in the aftermath of such an action, he warned. MbZ agreed with the USG,s tough line with Tehran and the Europeans. A nuclear-armed Iran would destabilize the Gulf region and possibly allow terrorist access to WMD. MbZ asked Lt. Gen. Dunn whether it would be possible for &anyone8 to "take out" all locations of concern in Iran via air power; Lt. Gen. Dunn voiced doubt that this would be possible given the dispersed locations. "Then it will take ground forces!" MbZ exclaimed. Ambassador noted that the UAE's Director of Military Intelligence, BG">BG Essa al Mazrouei, would pay counterpart visits this week to CENTCOM, J-2, DIA, and CIA for discussions on Iran and Iraq-related matters. MbZ said he looked forward to sharing "contingency planning" scenarios in future conversations.



5. (C) Ambassador asked about MbZ's visit the week before to Lahore to meet with Pakistani President Musharraf. MbZ chuckled and asked why the USG "always" convinced the Pakistanis to delay news of the capture of senior Al Qaeda operatives such as Abu Faraj al Libbi. MbZ went on to congratulate Washington for its decision to allow U.S. firms to bid for contracts to provide F-16s and other defense technology to Pakistan. It was important to support Musharraf as he battled the terrorists, he emphasized. While the Indians had and would continue to balk at the decision, the region needed Musharraf to stay strong. There was no alternative leader in sight, MbZ opined. Besides, he continued, the F-16 decision would not tip the military balance between India and Pakistan. Even if it had, India's strength as a stable democracy would ensure that it would not ever be in as "risky" a situation as its neighbor. MbZ then slapped his knee and said "you,ll never guess what Musharraf asked me...he asked me whether the UAE had received approval for the Predator!" (Note: the USG's inability to meet the UAE's request for an armed Predator remains a sore point for MbZ, although he has not directly raised the issue with us for some time.)

Gyrocopter, GAWC


6. (SBU) MbZ also referred to his interest in exploring selling the UAE's "gyrocopter" (a helicopter-supported UAV co-developed with Austrian company Schiebel) to the U.S. Air Force, an idea he first floated during Gen. Moseley,s visit for the May 3 F-16 ceremony. MbZ noted that his aide would pass detailed gyrocopter specifications to the Embassy this week. (Note: We will be exploring this initiative with CENTAF and CENTCOM in relation to force protection aerial surveillance system needs at Al Dhafra airbase for the 380 th Air Expeditionary Wing. End note.)

7. (C) Lt. Gen. Dunn complimented MbZ on the Gulf Air Warfare Center (GAWC), which he and the NDU group had toured that morning. MbZ expressed satisfaction over the relationship between the UAE and U.S. Air Forces, but expressed disappointment that more GCC countries had not joined recent GAWC classes. Ambassador noted the recent robust participation by Saudi Arabia in the GAWC's fourth class, which had included six Saudi F-15s and two young pilots who were also members of the Saudi royal family. MbZ asked whether the two high-ranking Saudis had actually completed all requirements for graduation or had been "passed through." Ambassador confirmed that they had completed all course requirements. MbZ commented that "the real reason" the Saudis had turned out for the GAWC class had been "to see what the UAE was up to" with the F-16 Block 60 and other procurement successes. Although Egypt and Jordan wished to join in the next GAWC class, MbZ added, they also wanted the UAE Air Force to pay fuel costs. MbZ said he had asked both countries "to go talk to ADNOC," the state-owned Abu Dhabi National Oil Company.



8. (U) MbZ noted that he would travel to Paris June 18-20 to meet with President Chirac, recalling that he had canceled his trip to France at the last minute in mid-January.

Camel Jockeys


9. (SBU) On the margins of the MbZ conversation, Ambassador thanked Interior Minister Sheikh Saif for his assistance the week before in allowing G/TIP visitor Feleke Assefa access to camel jockey rehabilitation and social support centers. Ambassador noted that a Tier 3 ranking remained a possibility despite the UAEG,s vigorous efforts since mid-March with UNICEF, IOM, and others. A trafficking in persons reassessment would take place in August, she noted, and it was important for the UAE to continue the good work it was doing in solving the problem. MbZ aide Yousef al Otaiba promised to forward a copy of the UAE-UNICEF TIP implementing agreement and budget. (Note: he has done so; we have forwarded the document electronically to G/TIP and NEA/ARPI. End note.)

Labor and the FTA


10. (SBU) Labor Minister al Ka'abi noted he had received reports that the U.S. and UAE sides had moved closer on the text of the labor chapter of the FTA during the last day of negotiations. He reiterated the UAEG,s concern that it receive some recognition of its unique demographic situation, as only 15 percent of the population held Emirati citizenship. SISON

US embassy cables: Saudi king urges US strike on Iran

  1. King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia repeatedly asks America to attack Iran to stop its nuclear programme. He warns that if Tehran develops a nuclear weapon, then so will the Saudis and other countries in the region. Key passage highlighted in yellow.

  2. Read related article
Sunday, 20 April 2008, 08:47
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 RIYADH 000649
EO 12958 DECL: 04/19/2018
Classified By: CDA Michael Gfoeller, Reasons 1.4 (b,d)
Sunday, 20 April 2008, 08:47
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 RIYADH 000649
EO 12958 DECL: 04/19/2018
Classified By: CDA Michael Gfoeller, Reasons 1.4 (b,d)

1. (S) Summary: US Ambassador to Iraq Ryan Crocker and General David Petraeus met with Saudi King Abdullah bin Abd al-Aziz, Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faisal, General Presidency of Intelligence Chief Prince Muqrin bin Abd al-Aziz, and Interior Minister Nayif bin Abd al-Aziz during their April 14-15 visit to Riyadh. The Saudi King and senior Princes reviewed Saudi policy toward Iraq in detail, all making essentially the same points. They said that the Kingdom will not send an ambassador to Baghdad or open an embassy until the King and senior Saudi officials are satisfied that the security situation has improved and the Iraqi government has implemented policies that benefit all Iraqis, reinforce Iraq's Arab identity, and resist Iranian influence. The Saudis evinced somewhat greater flexibility regarding the issues of economic and humanitarian assistance for Iraq and debt forgiveness. In a conversation with the Charge' on April 17, Saudi Ambassador to the US Adel al-Jubeir indicated that the King had been very impressed by the visit of Ambassador Crocker and General Petraeus, and al-Jubeir hinted that the Saudi government might announce changes to its Iraq policy before the President's visit to Riyadh in mid-May. End Summary.

Positive Signs in Iraq

2. (S) In all their meetings with the Saudi royals, both Ambassador Crocker and General Petraeus conveyed the progress in Iraq and confirmed the negative role Iran is playing in Iraq. They characterized the recent ISF-led operations in Basra and Baghdad as having a striking effect against the Shia militias, most importantly turning Iraqi public opinion away from the militias. While Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki's decision to take action against the militias was described as hasty and not well-planned, Ambassador Crocker and General Petraeus emphasized that any tactical shortfalls were overshadowed by the greater positive effect of unifying Iraq and demonstrating the GOI's, and most specifically al-Maliki's, determined resolve to take on the Shia militias, especially Jaysh al-Madhi. Concurrently, these operations unequivocally demonstrated Iran's subversive activities in Iraq and its broader regional ambitions. Throughout all their discussions, Ambassador Crocker and General Petraeus stressed the importance and urgent need for the Saudis to join us in supporting Iraq.

The Saudi Embassy Issue

3. (S) King Abdullah, the Foreign Minister, and Prince Muqrin all stated that the Saudi government would not send an ambassador to Baghdad or open an embassy there in the near future, citing both security and political grounds in support of this position. The Foreign Minister stated that he had considered dispatching an ambassador and had sent Saudi diplomats to Baghdad to identify a site for the Saudi embassy. However, he said. "the King simply forbade us to go any farther." King Abdullah confirmed this account in a separate meeting with Ambassador Crocker and General Petraeus. The King asserted that the security situation in Baghdad was too dangerous for him to risk sending a Saudi ambassador there. "He would immediately become a target for the terrorists and the militias," he said.

4. (S) The King also rejected the suggestion that by sending a Saudi ambassador to Baghdad he could give essential political support to the Iraqi government as it struggles to resist Iranian influence and subversion. He expressed lingering doubt on the Iraqi government's willingness to resist Iran. He also repeated his frequently voiced doubts about Iraqi Prime Minister al-Maliki himself by alluding to his "Iranian connections." The Saudi monarch stated that he does not trust al-Maliki because the Iraqi Prime Minister had "lied" to him in the past by promising to take certain actions and then failing to do so. The King did not say precisely what these allegedly broken promises might have been. He repeated his oft heard view that al-Maliki rules Iraq on behalf of his Shiite sect instead of all Iraqis.

5. (S) However, in a potentially significant move, the King did not reject the idea of dispatching a Saudi ambassador to Baghdad completely. Instead, he said that he would consider

RIYADH 00000649 002 OF 003

doing so after the Iraqi provincial elections are held in the autumn. The conduct of these elections would indicate whether or not the Iraqi government is truly interested in ruling on behalf of all Iraqis or merely in support of the Shia, King Abdullah asserted.

Grudging Acknowledgment of Change in Iraq

6. (S) The Foreign Minister signaled another potential softening in Saudi policy by saying that the Kingdom's problem was not with al-Maliki as a person but rather with the conduct of the Iraqi government. The King himself admitted that the Iraqi government's performance has improved in recent months and grudgingly accepted the point that al-Maliki and his security forces have indeed been fighting extremists, specifically Shia extremists in both Basra and Baghdad and Sunni extremists and Al Qaeda in Mosul. However, the King and the senior Princes argued that more time would be required to judge whether the recent change in Iraqi behavior was lasting and sincere. The King suggested that much of the Iraqi government's improved performance is attributable to US prodding rather than change in Iraqi attitudes.

7. (S) The Foreign Minister also suggested that the USG should prod Ayatollah Sistani to speak out in favor of a unified Iraq and national reconciliation among different Iraqi sects and groups. "You have paid a heavy price in blood and treasure, and Sistani and his people have benefited directly. You have every right to ask this of him," Prince Saud al-Faisal said.

Possible Saudi Economic Assistance

8. (S) The King, Prince Muqrin, and the Foreign Minister all suggested that the Saudi government might be willing to consider the provision of economic and humanitarian assistance to Iraq. Prince Muqrin asked Ambassador Crocker and General Petraeus to send him a list of the kinds of assistance that the US government would like to see the Kingdom provide Iraq. Al-Jubeir later told the Charge' that this assistance would be separate from the USD 1 billion in aid that the Saudi government had promised at the Madrid Conference but still not delivered due to security worries. He said that the Madrid commitment consisted of $500 million in trade credits and $500 million in project assistance with strict conditionally, along the lines of what the World Bank would require. Al-Jubeir added that the assistance the Saudi government might provide via Prince Muqrin would initially be in the range of $75-$300 million.

Possible Debt Relief

9. (S) The King noted that Saudi debt relief for Iraq "will come at some point," although he did not say when. Al-Jubeir told the Charge' that debt relief is a real possibility. He also noted that the Saudi government might make changes to its Iraq policy, perhaps including both assistance and debt relief, prior to the President's visit to Riyadh.

The Need to Resist Iran

10. (S) The King, Foreign Minister, Prince Muqrin, and Prince Nayif all agreed that the Kingdom needs to cooperate with the US on resisting and rolling back Iranian influence and subversion in Iraq. The King was particularly adamant on this point, and it was echoed by the senior princes as well. Al-Jubeir recalled the King's frequent exhortations to the US to attack Iran and so put an end to its nuclear weapons program. "He told you to cut off the head of the snake," he recalled to the Charge', adding that working with the US to roll back Iranian influence in Iraq is a strategic priority for the King and his government.

11. (S) The Foreign Minister, on the other hand, called instead for much more severe US and international sanctions on Iran, including a travel ban and further restrictions on bank lending. Prince Muqrin echoed these views, emphasizing that some sanctions could be implemented without UN approval. The Foreign Minister also stated that the use of military pressure against Iran should not be ruled out.

RIYADH 00000649 003 OF 003

12. (S) Comment: Saudi attitudes toward Iraq, from the King on down, remain marked by skepticism and suspicion. That said, the Saudis have noticed recent events in Iraq and are eager to work with the US to resist and reverse Iranian encroachment in Iraq. The King was impressed by Ambassador Crocker's and General Petraeus' visit, as were the Foreign Minister, GPI Chief, and Interior Minister. Cautious as ever, the Saudis may nevertheless be willing to consider new measures in the areas of assistance and debt relief, although further discussions will be required to make these ideas a reality. End Comment. 13. (U) This cable was reviewed and cleared by Ambassador Crocker and General Petraeus. GFOELLER

US embassy cables: Critic targeted by Iranian regime

  1. Ali Reza Nourizadeh, a prominent opponent of Iran's leadership and a regular commentator on Voice of America, is pursued by Mohammad Reza Sadeqinia - suspected of being a fixer who seeks to silence critics on behalf of the Iranian government. Key passage highlighted in yellow.

  2. Read relevant article
Thursday, 21 January 2010, 12:17
C O N F I D E N T I A L LONDON 000131
EO 12958 DECL: 01/19/2020
Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Greg Berry, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

1. (C/NF) SUMMARY: [DETAIL REMOVED] and prominent VOA commentator Ali Reza Nourizadeh recently told [NAME REMOVED] he had been targeted by Iranian intelligence, an allegation confirmed by London LEGATT. Nourizadeh was approached some months ago by Mohammad Reza Sadeqinia, an Iranian national who introduced himself as a "big fan" of Nourizadeh's. Nourizadeh met Sadeqinia on several occasions in London and Washington, DC, but became suspicious when Sadeqinia took large numbers of photos, including of Nourizadeh's vehicle. Sadeqinia was arrested in California on charges of soliciting murder after he attempted to hire a hitman to kill Iranian-American broadcaster Jamshid Sharmahd. Because his pattern of behavior towards Nourizadeh was similar to his interactions with Sharmahd, FBI shared the threat information with UK authorities, who subsequently warned Nourizadeh. END SUMMARY.

2. (C/NF) Ali Reza Nourizadeh [DETAILS REMOVED] had been visited by British anti-terrorism police who informed him he had been targeted by the Iranian regime. The UK authorities (who,[NAME REMOVED] later learned had received the threat information from the FBI) told Nourizadeh that Reza Sadeqinia, a man who had visited Nourizadeh several times in London and Washington, DC, was working for the Iranian intelligence services and gathering information on Nourizadeh's habits. They advised Nourizadeh that Sadeqinia had been arrested in California for soliciting the murder of Iranian-American broadcaster Jamshid Sharmahd.

3. (C/NF) Nourizadeh, obviously shaken by this news, told [NAME REMOVED] Sadeqinia had contacted him several months before, claiming to be a "big fan" of Nourizadeh's. Nourizadeh became suspicious after Sadeqinia insisted on taking large numbers of photos, including shots of Nourizadeh's car and garage. His suspicions were confirmed after he received a message from a well-placed friend who told Nourizadeh he had seen dozens of photos of him on the desk of Iranian Deputy Intelligence Minister Alavi. At that point, Nourizadeh stopped taking Sadeqinia's calls and heard nothing more about the matter until he was visited by UK anti-terror police January 14.

4. (C/NF) London LEGATT confirmed the arrest of Sadeqinia in the U.S. after he attempted to hire a man to kill Iranian-American broadcaster Jamshid Sharmahd of Tondar Radio. Prior to the solicitation of the hitman, videos of Sharmahd had begun to appear on YouTube with commentary that he was acting against Iran and an enemy of the state. Sadeqinia apparently admitted his surveillance of both Sharmahd and Nourizadeh and claimed he was working on behalf of Iranian intelligence. After similar videos of Nourizadeh were discovered, the FBI authorized UK authorities to share the threat information with Nourizadeh. UK authorities are working with Nourizadeh to improve his personal security, and Nourizadeh is cooperating by providing information about his interactions with Sadeqinia.

5. (C/NF) COMMENT: Nourizadeh is a well-known figure both inside and outside Iran, and is an outspoken critic of the Iranian regime, so it is unsurprising that the regime would want to keep a close eye on him. If, however, the regime has targeted Nourizadeh for assassination, as it appears to have done with Sharmahd, it marks a clear escalation in the regime's attempts to intimidate critics outside its borders, and could have a chilling effect on journalists, academics and others in the West who until recently felt little physical threat from the regime. Nourizadeh, while clearly taking the threat seriously, will not be cowed -- he's faced this type of threat before (many years ago when he first left Iran), and he has confidence in the British authorities' ability to protect him. In fact, he has encouraged other prominent opposition leaders like Shirin Ebadi and Mohsen Makhmalbaf to relocate to London for their own safety. END COMMENT.

Visit London's Classified Website: ed_Kingdom


US embassy cables: Ehud Barak sets deadline to resolve Iran nuclear ambitions

  1. Israeli defence minister warns that failure to prevent Iran getting nuclear weapons will trigger an arms race in the region. He estimates that the window of opportunity to thwart Tehran's nuclear ambitions is about to close. Key passage highlighted in yellow.

  2. Read related article
Tuesday, 02 June 2009, 06:19
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 001177
EO 12958 DECL: 06/01/2019
Classified By: DCM Luis G. Moreno, reasons 1.4 (b,d)

1. (C) Summary: Post hosted two CODELS during the week of May 25: one from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee led by Senator Casey, the other from the House Committee on Foreign Affairs led by Congressman Ackerman. Both delegations met with Defense Minister Ehud Barak, who conveyed similar points on the Peace Process and Israel's concerns about Iran. End summary.

Peace Process


2. (C) Barak began his meeting with the Casey delegation by apologizing for being late due to what he described as an "internal debate" at the Prime Minister's office regarding the development of a response to President Obama's upcoming speech in Cairo. He noted there are "perceived gaps" between the USG and the GOI regarding the Peace Process, and explained the GOI's internal debate is focused primarily on how to ensure that the U.S. and Israel "trust each other." Barak expressed confidence that PM Netanyahu is sincere in wanting to "seize this opportunity and move forward" with the Palestinians, but alluded to members of the coalition who do not agree with this course of action.

3. (C) From his perspective, Barak told the Casey delegation that the GOI was in no position to dictate policy to the Palestinians or the USG regarding the Peace Process -- "it takes two to tango, and three to negotiate," he said. Barak noted that it is the GOI's responsibility to ensure that "no stone is left unturned" regarding the Peace Process; if efforts to achieve peace ultimately fail, then the GOI must be able to state that every effort was pursued. He said he personally had no objection to "two states for two nations," and panned Arab arguments for a bi-national state in Israel. Barak said Israel envisions "two peoples living side by side in peace and good neighborliness" as the final goal.

4. (C) With the Ackerman delegation, Barak focused on the need for a regional approach to the peace process. He supports a regional initiative for peace and cooperation for the entire Middle East region to be launched by Israel. He stressed as well the need to build trust and convince the U.S. administration that the new Israeli government is "serious in its efforts toward peace."

5. (C) Barak commented on political developments in the West Bank and Gaza in both meetings. He said the GOI continues to review its policy, and then added that the Palestinian Authority has much to accomplish in terms of law enforcement, a functioning judiciary, and regaining control of Gaza before a "balanced" Palestinian state can be created. He has been extremely impressed with the work of U.S. Security Coordinator Gen. Dayton training PA security forces, and commended Salam Fayyad's concrete, practical approach.

6. (C) Barak made clear in these meetings that he feels the Palestinian Authority is weak and lacks self-confidence, and that Gen. Dayton's training helps bolster confidence. He explained that the GOI had consulted with Egypt and Fatah prior to Operation Cast Lead, asking if they were willing to assume control of Gaza once Israel defeated Hamas. Not surprisingly, Barak said, the GOI received negative answers from both. He stressed the importance of continued consultations with both Egypt and Fatah -- as well as the NGO community -- regarding Gaza reconstruction, and to avoid publicly linking any resolution in Gaza to the release of kidnapped IDF soldier Gilad Shalit.

Iran/North Korea


7. (C) In his meeting with CODEL Casey, Barak said the GOI believes its "keystone" relations with the USG remain strong. He described the integral role the USG plays in preserving Israel's Qualitative Military Edge (QME), especially when faced with threats posed by Iran, Hizballah, and Hamas. He noted that the GOI's positions on Iran are well known, and described North Korea's recent nuclear test as a "second wake-up call" (the first being the AQ Khan network). Barak asked rhetorically how a lack of firm response to North Korea would be interpreted by Iran's leadership, speculating the USG would be viewed as a "paper tiger."

8. (C) In both meetings, Barak said "no option should be removed from the table" when confronting Iran and North Korea; engagement will only work in conjunction with a credible military option, he said. Barak said he was

TEL AVIV 00001177 002 OF 002

personally skeptical that engagement would lead to an acceptable resolution, and argued in favor of a paradigm shift to confront the triple threat posed by nuclear proliferation, Islamic extremist terrorism, and rogue/failing states. He said a strategic partnership with China, Russia, India, and the EU is essential in facing these threats. Barak argued that failure to prevent a nuclear-armed Iran would result in a nuclear arms race in the region as Turkey, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia look to acquire nuclear weapons.

9. (C) When asked if the USG and GOI have fundamental differences of opinion when assessing Iran's nuclear program, Barak said we share the same intelligence, but acknowledged differences in analysis. He suggested that the USG view is similar to presenting evidence in a criminal court case in which a defendant is presumed innocent until proven guilty. As such, USG standards are tougher -- especially following the failure to find WMD in Iraq -- while end-products such as the 2007 NIE unintentionally take on a softer tone as a result. Barak said the fate of the region and the world rests on our ability to prevent Iran from gaining nuclear weapons -- as such, the standards for determining guilt should be lower as the costs are higher.

10. (C) In both meetings, Barak described Iranians as "chess, not backgammon players." As such, Iran will attempt to avoid any hook to hang accusations on, and look to Pakistan and North Korea as models to emulate in terms of acquiring nuclear weapons while defying the international community. He doubted Tehran would opt for an open, relatively low-threshold test like the recent one in North Korea. Rather, Iran will seek ways to bypass the NPT while ensuring its program is redundant and well-protected to prevent an irreparable military strike. Barak estimated a window between 6 and 18 months from now in which stopping Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons might still be viable. After that, he said, any military solution would result in unacceptable collateral damage. He also expressed concern that should Iran develop nuclear capabilities, other rogue states and/or terrorist groups would not be far behind.



11. (C) Barak reinforced his message regarding Pakistan in both meetings. He described Pakistan as his "private nightmare," suggesting the world might wake up one morning "with everything changed" following a potential Islamic extremist takeover. When asked if the use of force on Iran might backfire with moderate Muslims in Pakistan, thereby exacerbating the situation, Barak acknowledged Iran and Pakistan are interconnected, but disagreed with a causal chain. To the contrary, he argued that if the United States had directly confronted North Korea in recent years, others would be less inclined to pursue nuclear weapons programs. By avoiding confrontation with Iran, Barak argued, the U.S. faces a perception of weakness in the region.

12. (U) CODELS Casey and Ackerman did not have the opportunity to clear this message.

********************************************* ******************** Visit Embassy Tel Aviv's Classified Website: ********************************************* ******************** CUNNINGHAM

US embassy cables: the documents

Secret US embassy cables taken from a cache of 250,000 cables leaked to the Guardian by whistleblowers' website WikiLeaks

US embassy cables: the documents

US embassy cables: The Saudi foreign ministry cautions against attacking Iran

  1. A senior Saudi official takes a more cautious view on containing Iran, preferring jaw-jaw to war-war. Key passage highlighted in yellow.

  2. Read related article
Tuesday, 22 July 2008, 05:00
S E C R E T RIYADH 001134
EO 12958 DECL: 07/20/2018
REF: A. SECSTATE 74879 B. RIYADH 43 Classified By: Charge' d'Affaires Michael Gfoeller for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

1. (S) On July 21, Pol Counselor delivered demarche on the upcoming Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) Foreign Ministers meeting scheduled for Tehran from July 27-30 (Reftel A) to Saudi MFA Deputy Director for Western Affairs Department Mojahid Ali Alwahbi.

2. (S) Alwahbi informed us that Saudi Minister of State for Foreign Affairs (MFA Deputy Secretary equivalent) Dr. Nizar bin Obaid Madani would lead the Saudi delegation. He assured us Saudi Arabia did not want the NAM meeting to become an Iranian propaganda event, adding he had seen the proposed agenda and did not expect it to develop in such a manner. Alwahbi agreed Iran's continued nuclear enrichment was a grave SAG concern with regional security implications (Reftel B).

3. (S) Alwahbi strongly advised against taking military action to neutralize Iran's program. Rather, establishing a US-Iranian dialogue was the best course of action, asserting that the USG opening an Interest Section or re-opening our Embassy in Tehran would be positive step. Alwahbi was heartened by the USG's initiative for Under Secretary Burns to meet with the Iranians last week in Geneva. He added that, in his view, Iran's position was "shifting" and wanted to avoid escalation of tensions. He noted his belief that the Russians had recently been effectively pressuring Iran to be less provocative. Alwahbi concluded that he expected Iran to keep tensions relatively low at least until after the US presidential election.

4. (S) COMMENT. These comments are typical of Saudi MFA bureaucrats who take a pacific stance towards Iran, but diverge significantly from the more bellicose advice we have gotten from senior Saudi royals. END COMMENT. GFOELLER

US embassy cables: Saudi official warns Gulf states may go nuclear

  1. Countries in the region might develop or host nuclear weapons to deter the perceived threat from Iran, the US is told. Key passage highlighted in yellow.

  2. Read relevant article
Wednesday, 28 January 2009, 15:50
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 RIYADH 000181
EO 12958 DECL: 01/27/2019

1. (C) SUMMARY & COMMENT: Netherlands Ambassador Ron Strikker, Russian Ambassador Victor Gibinvish, and Embassy Riyadh Pol/Mil Counselor Scott McGehee met on January 25 with Dr. Prince Turki Al-Kabeer, Undersecretary for Multilateral Affairs at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to deliver a joint demarche on the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT). The meeting evolved into a pointed exchange between the Russian Ambassador and Dr. Prince Turki on Iran's nuclear ambitions. Prince Turki warned that if Iran tried to produce nuclear weapons, other countries in the Gulf region would be compelled to do the same, or to permit the stationing of nuclear weapons in the Gulf to serve as a deterrent to the Iranians. Turki then pointedly demanded that the US keep Saudi officials informed about US plans for Iran.

2. (C) Dr. Prince Turki is not a decision-maker, but he is a reliable transmitter of official Saudi thinking. Most of what he said is not new, although this is the most explicit mention we have heard of Saudi willingness to see nuclear weapons deployed in the GCC as a deterrent to Iran. His concern that the United States will negotiate a "grand bargain" with Iran without consulting Saudi Arabia is a concern we have heard often in recent weeks. End summary & comment.

3. (C) After hearing a brief verbal demarche from Ambassador Strikker on the upcoming June Plenary of the GICNT, Dr. Turki turned to Ambassador Gibinvish, saying, "On this issue, what concerns us most is how to get our neighbor to change its policy on enrichment." Iran needs to be convinced to enter a dialogue on this matter, he continued, noting that Saudi Arabia is also concerned about the Russian-built reactor at Bushehr. A leakage from a plant at that location could bring an environmental catastrophe to Saudi Arabia, pointing out that it is located less than 300 kilometers away from Saudi shores, across open water.

4. (C) Ambassador Gibinvish was able to say only "Sure, I agree!" before Prince continued, "The location is so dangerous! Not just to us, but to the world economy!" He urged that Russia use its influence to have the reactor moved north, suggesting that a location on the shore of the Caspian Sea would be much better, where there is water available for reactor cooling, and where mountains rise behind to contain any possible leakage from moving south. Perhaps more troubling, he said, is Iran's pursuit of nuclear enrichment. He explained that if Iran tries to produce nuclear weapons, other countries in the Gulf region would be compelled to do the same, or to permit the stationing of nuclear weapons in the Gulf to serve as a deterrent to the Iranians.

5. (C) Amb. Gibinvish responded that Iran's desire to enrich uranium reflected its fears that it will someday be attacked by Israel or the United States and also a sign of Iran's desire to establish its "supremacy" in the region. Prince Turki interjected: "And we cannot accept Iranian supremacy in the region. We are okay with nuclear electrical power and desalination, but not with enrichment." He said that the prospect of Iranian enrichment raises troubling questions about their motivations for doing so: "they do not need it!"

6. (S) Amb. Gibinvish noted that "some experts in Russia believe that Iran will have a bomb in 10 to 15 years." Russia, he said, is concerned about this matter as well, and has "put forward initiatives" with Iran. Russia hopes to discuss this further with Saudi Arabia in the near future, and he said that an "important delegation" would be coming to Riyadh in about two months to discuss this with the Saudi leadership. Prince Turki said that the Russian delegation would be welcomed, stressing that "we must work together to get them to abandon their effort to acquire nuclear weapons. Israel too, he said, must be convinced to surrender its nuclear arsenal. But you deal with them, you have influence, that is why I raise this with you." Amb. Gibinvish pledged that "we will do what we can. But the Iranians are difficult partners." At this point, Prince Turki turned to Pol/Mil Counselor who had momentarily stopped taking notes. Prince Turki said "Please write this down. Whatever is discussed with the Iranians, we must be kept informed! Any

RIYADH 00000181 002 OF 002

negotiations with the Iranians must take into account the interests of Saudi Arabia, otherwise, we will not accept it! We should be told -- in advance! -- of what you plan to say."


USA WikiLeaks Embassy Cables _From The Guardian

Anna Nicole Smith US embassy cables

How Anna Nicole charmed Bahamas

Island was intoxicated by antics of former model, whose death revitalised media and led to government scrutiny

Julian Assange defends decision not to face questioning in Sweden

julian assange close up WikiLeaks founder says he is not obliged to return to be questioned over sexual assault allegations

US embassy in London

The key points at a glance

There are no fewer than 251,287 cables from more than 250 US embassies around the world, obtained by WikiLeaks. We present a day-by-day guide to the revelations from the US embassy cables both from the Guardian and its international media partners in the story

All the Guardian's embassy cables stories

Assange reported to have sold memoirs

Julian Assange

WikiLeaks founder expected to publish book in March, through UK publishers Canongate

Wikileaks page Audio (39min 01sec)

Latest news

Latest on the Julian Assange case

Key points: day by day

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About the cables

Latest on the Julian Assange case

Key points: day by day

Latest comment

You ask, we search

About the cables


WIKILEAKS founder Julian Assange's lawyer says he has seen police documents that prove the whistleblower is innocent of rape claims.

Bjrn Hurtig, who is representing Assange in Sweden, said the documents, which form part of the official Swedish investigation, revealed two women had lied about being coerced into having sex with Mr Assange, 39. Assange is being held in Wandsworth prison, London, while fighting extradition to Sweden.

Assange met both women at a seminar in Stockholm last August. After having intercourse with each, at different times, he faced sex charges, which he strenuously denies, that were withdrawn and then reinstated.


In an interview from his Stockholm office, Mr Hurtig said: "From what I have read, it is clear that the women are lying and that they had an agenda when they went to the police, which had nothing to do with a crime having taken place.


"It was, I believe, more about jealousy and disappointment on their part ...

"If I am able to reveal what I know, everyone will realise this is all a charade," he said. MAIL ON SUNDAY

WikiLeaks cable shed light on Singaporeans' view of Anwar

 2010-12-12 16:19

KUALA LUMPUR, Sunday 12 December 2010 (Bernama) -- Singapore's intelligence services as well as its senior minister Lee Kuan Yew believe that opposition leader Datuk Seri Anwar Ibrahim "did indeed commit the acts for which he is currently indicted."

This was revealed by WikiLeaks through a release of a US State Department cable issued in November 2008.

The cable was exclusively released to the Australian tabloid, The Sun-Herald, and was widely reported by other Australian newspapers today.

WikiLeaks is a website that publishes anonymous submissions and leaks of sensitive governmental, corporate, organisational, or religious documents, while attempting to preserve the anonymity and untraceability of its contributors.

The US State Department cable that dealt with Anwar's sodomy case, dated November 2008, and was released exclusively to The Sun-Herald by WikiLeaks, had stated:''The Australians said that Singapore's intelligence services and [Singaporean elder statesman] Lee Kuan Yew have told ONA in their exchanges that Opposition leader Anwar 'did indeed commit the acts for which he is currently indicted'.''

In the newspaper report, it said the document stated that the Singaporeans told ONA that they made this assessment on the basis of ''technical intelligence'', which was likely to relate to intercepted communications.

WIKILEAKS founder Julian Assange's lawyer says he has seen police documents that prove the whistleblower is innocent of rape claims.

MySinchew 2010.12.12

Martijn Gonlag

Second Dutch teenager arrested for WikiLeaks-related DDoS attacks

by Graham Cluley on December 12, 2010 | Comments (4)

FILED UNDER: FeaturedLaw & orderMalware

Police in the Netherlands have arrested a second teenager in relation to the pro-WikiLeaks distributed denial-of-service attacks seen earlier this week.

The arrest of the 19-year-old man follows Friday's attacks on websites belonging to Dutch Police and national prosecutor's office, which were themselves widely seen as retaliation against the apprehension the day before of a 16-year-old Dutch boy alleged to have participated in "Anonymous" pro-WikiLeaks attacks against a number of websites, including MasterCard and PayPal.

Prosecutors claim that the 19-year-old, from Hoogezand-Sappemeer, in the north east of the Netherlands, flooded the prosecutor's website with internet traffic:

"From behind his computer, the man used hacker software to flood the website of the prosecutor’s office with as much digital traffic as possible. Investigations by the National Police Services Agency showed that the man, who was active under the internet nickname Awinee, urged other internet users to participate in the attack."

However, it is reported that the DDoS attack software being used did not hide the IP address of the computer involved, making it easy for high-tech crime cops to identify where the attack was coming from.

That's a pretty silly mistake to make if you're going to attack the website of your country's national prosecutor.

Who is "Awinee"? Well, a quick search on Google found a gaming website of a guy who lives in Hoogezand-Sappemeer, is 19 years old, and uses the online nickname "Awinee", going by the real name of Martijn Gonlag:

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Protests expected outside court for WikiLeaks Julian Assange

Protests expected outside court  for WikiLeaks Julian Assange

Tuesday 14 December 2010
WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange will ask to be granted bail when he appears before City of Westminster Magistrates' Court for a second time today.
The former computer hacker was remanded in custody last week, despite the offer of surety from a number of high-profile backers, including journalist John Pilger, director Ken Loach, and charity fundraiser Jemima Khan.

If Julian Assange is denied bail, he is expected to appeal at the High Court.

The Australian, 39, turned himself into police after an international warrant was issued accusing him of sex offences in Sweden. Charges are thought to include rape and molestation in one case, and molestation and unlawful coercion in a second. Assange has denied the allegations, which he has claimed stem from a dispute over "consensual but unprotected sex." He has vowed to fight extradition to Sweden.

According to Australian media reports, supporters of Assange and WikiLeaks are expected to protest outside the court.

Yesterday, around 15 supporters of the 'Justice for Assange' campaign gathered outside the Swedish Embassy in central London. They held banners saying "political prisoner" and "gagging the truth" and wore masks of Assange's face.
His court appearance comes as another cable released through the WikiLeaks site reveals the United States was concerned that the UK was struggling to cope with home-grown extremists in the year after the 7th July bombings in London.

In the cable, a diplomat noted that Tony Blair's embarked on a drive to isolate radicals from the mainstream Muslim community after the 2005 attacks.

The message from the US Embassy states: "Since 7/7, HMG [Her Majesty's Government] has invested considerable time and resources in engaging the British Muslim community. The current tensions demonstrate just how little progress has been made."

Another cable suggests British police helped 'develop' evidence against Madeleine McCann's parents as they were investigated by Portuguese authorities investigating the disappearance of their daughter.

Julian Assange
Enemy of the State Hero of the People
By Lucy Carne LONDON
SEEDS OF CHANGE: Julian Assange the boy and the thorn in the side of governments, and a rally by his Brisbane supporters this week
In front of an adoring crowd at the Frontline journalist’s club in London last month, Australia Julian Assange explained why he’s risking the wrath of the world’s most powerful governments.
In his face could still be seen traces of the sweet natured, sensitive little boy his Sunshine Coast-based mother has described and, smiling, the Queensland born 39 year old leaned into the microphone.
“They say I enjoy crushing bastards and. Yes, that’s part of my motivation,” Assange said.
“For some reason, the White House finds that offensive.”
Today, the founder if whistle blowing website WikiLeaks and the man on whom the world’s spotlight is focused, sits is a grey tracksuit in one of western Europe’s biggest prsions.
This week he was remanded in custody of rape, sexual assault and unlawful coercion stemming from alleged  non-consensual sex without a condom with two women in Sweden.
Assange’s imprisonment, after he handed himself in, was met with relief in the US, where authorities were angered by his website’s release of embarrassing diplomatic cables last week.
The man who kicked the hornets’ nest had been silences they thought.
“I hadn’t heard that but it sounds like good news to me,” US Defence Secretary Robert Gates said on being told of Assange’s arrest.
But while Assange grows restless behind bars – he has already complained about the “boring” daytime television and his request to be reunited with his own laptop has been denied – a global groundswell of support has grown.
The strongest act of revenge is coming from a group of ”hacktivists”  known as Anomymous, which temporariiy shut down the websites of US and Swedish corporations this week.
The group also froze the websites of credit-card companies Visa and Mastercard,n which had cancelled financial donations to WikiLeaks.
Post Finance – the Swiss bank that froze Assange’s private account – was disabled too, as was the Swedish prosecution office and the Swedish lawyers representing the two  women who claim  to have been sexually assaulted by Assange.
The Anonymous group’s spokesman, known only as Coldblood, told reports they had not met Assange and were not connected to his organization but felt the need to defend him.
“If we let WikiLeaks fall without a fight then government will think they can just take down any sites they wish or disagree with,” Coldblood said.
In Brisbane on Thursday, some 300 protestors took to the streets in anger at Assange’s imprisonment.
Protests in London were due to be held today.
More than 35,000 people have joined a Facebook group to support Assange, with calls for all members to donate to his legal fund, while around 28,000 Australians have signed a letter to US President BARACK Obama supporting him.
In an open letter published yesterday, prominent supports, including Australia documentary film maker John Pilger, Minty Python member Terry Jones, English actress Miriam Margolyes and author Iain Banks, call for his immediate release from jail
Assange’s unusually harsh imprisonment for allegedly ignoring two women’s  requests to use contraception has caused this sudden swell of skepticism and fury.
Many believe it is a flimsy excuse to keep Assange, who was placed on Interpol’s most wanted list, within reach of the US Justice Department so it can prosecute him under the Espionage Act.
Even while he is hailed by the public as a champion of transparency, to the governments of Australia and the US he remains a menace. To them he is not an innocent messenger but an anti-government terrorist who wants to harm the US and governments across the world.
Australian Prime Minister Julia Gillard labeled WikiLeaks’s activities illegal but, despite calls for her to do so, has failed to outline any Australian law that Assange has broken.
Federal Attorney-General Robert McClelland also has stood by his condemnation of Assange, while arch-conservative US politician Sarah Palin called him an anti-American operative with blood on his hands.”
How did the tousled-haired boy in overalls grow up to become an Andy Warhol-esque hero of the people.
“Hr can seem – with his spectral white hair, pa8iled skin, cool eyes, and expansive forehead – like a rail thin being who has rocketed to Earth to deliver humanity some hidden truth,” The New Yorker wrote in June.
Born in Townsville in 1971, Assange has described his childhood as “pretty Tom Sawyer”’ filled with horseriding, building rafts and fishing.
I was, however, far from Idyllic. By the age od 14, his family had moved 37 times, living everywhere from Magnetic Island to Byron Bay. It set the scene for his future nomadic life.
The young boy was home schooled, sporadically educated by university professors and even taught himself in hours spent alone in council libraries.
But his life changed when his mother’s abusive boyfriend tried to gain custody of Assange’s half brother in order to submit him to religious sect The Family.
His mother and her young family “disappeared”, constantly moving, never leaving a trail.
But at the age of 16, in 1987, Assange got a computer and modem and his life was suddenly transformed.
He embraced the random problem-solving and solace if life as a computer hacker.
“We were bright sensitive kinds who didn’t fit the dominant subculture and fiercely castigated those who did as irredeemable boneheads,” he wrote of himself and a teenage friend.
He was arrested in the early 1990’sw for hacking into the computer system of a major Canadian telecommunications company, but avoided a prison sentence of up to 10 years.
A brief spell in hospital for depression soon followed, as well as time spent living rough in the Dandenong Ranges National Park in Victoria and a stint motorcycling across Vietnam.
While working towards a physics degree at the University of Melbourne in 2006, He founded WikiLeaks.
It was a site for anyone wishing to “reveal illegal or immoral behavior in their own governments and corporations” he wrote at the time of the site’s launch.
“ I am the one who9 takes that risk,” he said prophetically, explaining his role at WikiLeaks while addressing the Frontline club last monthly. “As a consequence, I also get a lot of undue credit. I also get all the criticism.”
His original WikiLeaks mandate was to9 “make the news, not be the news”.
But that seems to have backfired, with Assange now a household name around the world.
“Is is weird?” an audience member asked him of his new celebrity status.
“No,” Assange shrugged.” Actually, I find it quite boring.”
Lucy Marne is The Courier-Mail’s European correspondent

Dear Friend,

Sarah Palin wants Julian Assange hunted as a terrorist.1 She's among a swelling chorus of American politicians calling for the arrest - and even the death - of the Australian citizen who runs WikiLeaks. It's a shame that real terrorists, the kind we should be focusing our attention on, don't show up at British Police stations with their lawyers, as WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange did yesterday.

Here in Australia, Prime Minister Gillard pre-emptively judged Mr. Assange "illegal," even as the Attorney General confirmed that no Australian nor international crime by WikiLeaks has been identified.2

The death penalty? Judgment before trial? This isn't the kind of justice system we have in Australia. If our Government won't stand up for the rights of Australian citizens, let's do it ourselves.

We're printing ads in The Washington Times and The New York Times with the statement our Government should have made, signed by as many Australians as possible. Will you add your name to the signatories, and invite your friends to join too?

The statement:Dear President Obama and Attorney General Eric Holder:

We, as Australians, condemn calls for violence, including assassination, against Australian citizen and WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange, or for him to be labeled a terrorist, enemy combatant or be treated outside the ordinary course of justice in any way.

As Thomas Jefferson said, "information is the currency of democracy."3 Publishing leaked information in collaboration with major news outlets, as Wikileaks and Mr. Assange have done, is not a terrorist act.

Australia and the United States are the strongest of allies. Our soldiers serve side by side and we've experienced, and condemned, the consequences of terrorism together. To label WikiLeaks a terrorist organisation is an insult to those Australians and Americans who have lost their lives to acts of terrorism and to terrorist forces.

If WikiLeaks or their staff have broken international or national laws, let that case be heard in a just and fair court of law. At the moment, no such charges have been brought.

We are writing as Australians to say what our Government should have said: that all Australian citizens deserve to be free from persecution, threats of violence and detention without charge, especially from our friend and ally, the United States.

We call upon you to stand up for our shared democratic principles of the presumption of innocence and freedom of information.We're printing this statement in The Washington Times and The New York Times early next week - and the more Australians sign, the more powerful the message will be. Please add your name by clicking below, and forward this message to friends and family:

What has started with WikiLeaks being branded as terrorists won't end there.

In fact, just yesterday U.S. Senator Joe Lieberman, Chair of the Senate's Homeland Security Committee, said thatThe New York Times should also be investigated under the U.S. Espionage Act for publishing a number of the diplomatic cables leaked to WikiLeaks.4 We can help stop such plans in their tracks, by showing how they are affecting the image of the US in the eyes of their staunchest friends and allies.

Click here to sign the statement before it's published in The New York Times and Washington Times.

Thanks for being part of this,
The GetUp team


1 Beckford, M., 'Sarah Palin: hunt WikiLeaks founder like al-Qaeda and Taliban leaders', The Telegraph, 30 November 2010.

2 Oakes, L., 'Oakes: Gillard gushes over US leaks', Perth Now, 4 December 2010.

3 The quote is widely attributed to Jefferson, but some now dispute whether he actually said it. We know, at least, that he said "knowledge is power," even if Francis Bacon did say it first.

4 Savage, C., 'U.S. prosecuters study WikiLeaks prosecution', The New York Times, 7 December 2010.

US embassy cables: Mandela 'furious' at adviser after Thatcher meeting vetoed

  1. Nelson Mandela was keen to meet Margaret Thatcher just over two months after his release to challenge her views on the ANC. He was "furious" with his top adviser Zwelakhe Sisulu for persuading the ANC to veto the plans. Key passage highlighted in yellow.

  2. Read related article
Thursday, 03 May 1990, 10:04
E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR








US embassy cables: Abu Dhabi favours action to prevent a nuclear Iran

  1. The crown prince of the emirate, Sheikh Mohammad bin Zayed, outlines his fears about the intention of the Iranian regime and its president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Key passage highlighted in yellow.

  2. Read relevant article

US embassy cables: Abu Dhabi favours action to prevent a nuclear Iran

  • Article history
  • Monday, 10 April 2006, 14:23
    S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ABU DHABI 001401
    EO 12958 DECL: 04/09/2016
    REF: A. 05 ABU DHABI 3243 B. 05 ABU DHABI 3565 C. ABU DHABI 409 D. ABU DHABI 779 E. ABU DHABI 1228 F. ABU DHABI 248 (NOTAL) G. ABU DHABI 176 H. ABU DHABI 605 I. USDEL 00007 J. ABU DHABI 1123 K. ABU DHABI 909 (NOTAL)
    Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

1. (S) Summary. Embassy Abu Dhabi looks forward to welcoming you to the UAE on April 23. In the aftermath of the controversy of the Dubai Ports World acquisition of P&O, your assurances to Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed (MbZ), your host for the visit, that the USG values the UAE as an ally and friend will be well received. While you should commend the UAE for its assistance and cooperation, you should take advantage of your luncheon with MbZ and his brother, State Security Director Sheikh Hazza, to push the UAE on several areas of interest to the USG: counterterrorism, counter terror finance, Iran, Hamas, Iraq, and ideological extremism (each is covered in the scenesetter). The UAE remains a committed partner in the global war on terror, but it continues to take an ad hoc approach to countering terrorism that "solves" the problem for the UAE locally, but fails to contribute on a transnational basis. In January, the U.S. and the UAE held the first meeting of the Joint Terrorist Finance Coordinating Committee (JTFCC), but the discussions were not as detailed or as robust as the U.S. delegation anticipated. Treasury U/S Levey will return to the UAE to hold a second meeting April 30 that will focus on cash couriers and charities.

2. (S) Although the UAE regards Iran as one of its most serious threats to national security, UAE officials are reluctant to take actions that could anger their neighbor and compromise their extensive trading relationship. At the same time, we are seeing more of a willingness on the part of the UAE to support USG initiatives without the full approval of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). As tensions escalate between Iran and the international community, the UAE is growing increasingly nervous. The UAE leadership--which has told us they consider Hamas a terrorist organization--plans to uphold its previous commitments of humanitarian assistance to the Palestinian people. The UAE has taken an active role in encouraging Sunni participation in the Iraqi political process and it continues to condemn the sectarian violence that is preventing stabilization of the country. In the face of growing ideological extremism in the Gulf, the UAE leadership is politically determined not to allow Islamist extremists to gain a foothold on UAE soil. End Summary.

Counterterrorism Efforts


3. (S) The UAE is concerned about the terrorist threat to the UAE, but lacks a comprehensive implementation strategy for reducing its vulnerability (ref A). The UAE considers homeland security one of its top priorities, but rather than prioritizing national security projects, its efforts have focused on contracting risk assessments, forming committees, and procuring equipment. The UAE has also aggressively tried to prevent the radicalization of UAE nationals and Arab/South Asian expatriates. UAE officials publicly and strongly condemn extremism and terrorist attacks, anti-extremism has been the focus of government-approved Friday sermons in the mosques, and the UAE ministry of Education has modernized the Islamic studies curriculum in its schools.

4. (S) The UAEG government reacts quickly when presented with evidence of a terrorist presence inside the UAE, but does not approach the problem from a transnational manner. The UAE's immediate response when terrorists pose a risk is to deport them. UAE agencies do not investigate fully to see how far the problem goes or whether there is an international network involved. Although the U.S./UAE counterterrorism cooperation is strong (with the UAE working closely with the USG on specific cases), Emiratis do not consistently share lead information found in the possession of individuals in their custody with each other or with the U.S. Government. These tactics limit law enforcement and intelligence services' ability to use intelligence to disrupt extremist cells and planned attacks. The UAE's insistence on deportation as a solution does not protect the country long-term or truly address the nature and scope of the problem. The UAEG must be willing to take action against Emirati nationals, it must investigate fully, and it must share information with other Gulf countries and with the USG.

5. (S) The only way to generate significant change in the UAE on the issue of counterterrorism is to convince the senior leadership that it needs to continue to display political will and commitment in tackling the terror challenge with a transnational approach. MbZ is the person most able to elicit this type of change. Embassy recommends you have a frank and forthright discussion during your meeting with MbZ and his younger brother, Hazza, to encourage this type of change. Although you should commend them for the UAE's CT efforts and cooperation, you should also encourage them to be personally involved in developing a more effective and fully cooperative counterterrorism posture.

Counterterrorism Finance


6. (S) The UAE has made significant strides in regulating the financial sector against money laundering and terrorist financing (ref B). Although the UAE now has a strong legal framework in place, it must turn its efforts to enforcement. It is imperative that UAE authorities investigate and prosecute violators of terror finance/anti-money laundering, cash courier, and charity laws and regulations. To date, investigation and prosecution has been weak. In an effort to increase U.S. and UAE cooperation on terrorist financing, the first meeting of the U.S/UAE Joint Terrorist Finance Coordinating Committee (JTFCC) was held in Abu Dhabi on January 24, 2005 (ref C). The UAE team had representatives from the Central Bank, State Security, Ministries of Interior, Foreign Affairs, and Justice. However, no one participated from Dubai. In order for the JTFCC to be an effective committee, Dubai's Police, State Security, Customs, and the Department of Islamic Affairs and Charities must participate. Embassy is coordinating a second meeting April 30 that will focus on cash couriers and charity regulations.



7. (S/NF) UAE leaders are very concerned about escalating tensions between Iran and the international community. The UAE feels vulnerable--as evidenced by the fact that its leaders frequently note that Iran is "very near" the UAE. Commercial ties between Dubai and Iran are significant (Dubai is Iran's largest non-oil trading partner), and as a result the UAEG walks a fine line between maintaining and encouraging this trade and working to prevent suspected Iranian proliferation activities. Although the UAEG is worried about Iran's nuclear ambitions, its short-term policy decisions regarding Iran center on not provoking its neighbor. The USG has approached the UAEG four times since January, asking it to interdict and inspect cargo suspected of going to Iran's nuclear and/or missile programs. None of those instances have resulted in a successful interdiction. In the first two instances UAE officials simply refused to take action (refs F and G). The Director of Dubai's State Security Organization explained during the 11 February U.S./UAE Counterproliferation Task Force meeting that the decision to not inspect the containers had been a political decision based on the UAE's concern that Iran might retaliate (ref H). In the two later instances (ref K), ships that had been scheduled to arrive in Dubai went directly to Bandar Abbas.

8. (S) In recent meetings with senior USG officials, MbZ has expressed clear support for U.S. initiatives against Iran. MbZ and UAE Vice President and Prime Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid agreed with Secretary Rice February 23 about the need to counter Iran's growing influence in the region and its nuclear ambitions, although they specified that any sanctions should target the key Iranian leadership, not the Iranian people (ref I). MbZ told A/S Welch March 28 that he did not think it was necessary to wait for all Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries to agree before proceeding with any plans against Iran (ref E). "Whoever is interested in getting on board ship should be encouraged," he said. "I don't think it's logical or smart to wait for everyone to get involved so we can sail. ... If another GCC member believes it's not right, that's his choice." In the Arab region, MbZ specifically identified Bahrain and Jordan as two countries that also view Iran as a threat and that are "capable to work with us." He told A/S Welch that the UAE would prepare a paper responding to USG concerns about Iran and mechanisms for addressing the challenge posed by Iran. In a March 27 meeting with CENTCOM Commander General Abizaid, MbZ spoke about the Iranian threat with a greater sense of urgency. He was strongly in favor of taking action against Iran and its president sooner rather than later. "I believe this guy is going to take us to war. ... It's a matter of time," MbZ warned, adding that action against Iran and President Ahmedinejad should be taken this year or next year. MbZ said he was unwilling to wait much longer. "Personally, I cannot risk it with a guy like Ahmedinejad. He is young and aggressive."

9. (S/NF) SSD Director Hazza told A/S Welch March 29 that the Ayatollah Ali Khameini had once issued a fatwa prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons by Iran, but noted that this should not be considered a guarantee. Hazza assessed that Iran is also a threat due to its ties to international terrorist organizations, including al-Qaida, as well as their financial support to Hamas. He added that the relationship between Iran and Syria, and their links to Hizballah, was also of concern, as was Iran's attempts to expand its influence in Iraq and elsewhere in the world. MbZ also expressed to A/S Welch March 28 the concern that Hizballah was supporting Hamas. During your meeting, you should explain the graduated approach to addressing Iran in the United Nations Security Council and encourage the UAE to isolate Iran--regardless of potential economic backlash. You should also explain the importance of the UAE working closely with the USG on interdiction requests. This meeting will be a good follow-on to the discussion U/S Joseph had with Foreign Minister Abdullah bin Zayed al-Nahyan (AbZ) on April 8, where Joseph outlined the USG's policy priorities for Iran (septel). (Note: While AbZ, like MbZ, expressed support for U.S. initiatives against Iran, he stated that the USG should come to the UAE as a "very last resort. ... If you can solve something without involving the UAE, please do so." End Note.)

Palestinian Territories/Hamas


10. (S) UAE leaders have told us that they consider Hamas a terrorist organization and that they would not fund Hamas unless they denounce violence (refs D and E). However, after Hamas political chief Khaled Meshaal visited Abu Dhabi on March 22 and met with UAE Minister of Presidential Affairs Sheikh Mansour bin Zayed al-Nahyan and Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Mohammed al-Sha'ali, Meshaal publicly claimed that the UAEG had pledged to continue to provide financial assistance to the Hamas-led Palestinian Authority (ref J). MbZ told A/S Welch March 28 that the UAEG allowed Meshaal to come, but that "officially, we don't recognize Khaled Meshaal." MbZ said that once a new Palestinian Prime Minister is selected, UAEG officials will travel to the Palestinian territories to ascertain that UAEG assistance is "going to the right people." UAE Vice President and Prime Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid sounded a note of optimism when he told Secretary Rice February 23 that Hamas, "with some pressure," would understand the need to respect the will of the international community.

11. (S) The UAE has historically provided significant financial assistance to the Palestinian people. Typically, the UAE sends aid to the Palestinian territories through charity organizations, or by projectized assistance; but the UAEG has also provided financial assistance directly to the Palestinian Authority, most recently $20 million in March 2006 to Mahmoud Abbas for salaries. In the wake of the Hamas electoral victory, UAE leaders told us they intend to honor their previous commitments of humanitarian assistance (including the $100 million Sheikh Khalifa housing complex that was announced last year).

12. (S/NF) In his meeting with A/S Welch March 29, SSD Director Hazza assessed that there was both a positive and a negative side to the Hamas election win. On the negative side, he cited Hamas' position with regard to Israel, and their violent agenda. On the positive side, Hazza noted the fact that Hamas was now in power and was accountable to the international community. He spoke to A/S Welch of the threat posed by the Muslim Brotherhood. Hazza also asked A/S Welch how the USG would react to those countries that did support the Hamas government, and whether they would run afoul of U.S. laws restricting support to terrorist organizations. A/S Welch replied that that would be a problem, emphasizing that no money should go to the government unless Hamas renounced violence and accepted Israel. A/S Welch also told Hazza that it was not the responsibility of the U.S. or other Arab countries to pay the salaries of the new Hamas government, underscoring the need for Hamas to show accountability. MbZ told A/S Welch that Hamas benefited from "official and private contributions" from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Qatar. MbZ said it was "easy to take $1 million in a suitcase" to Lebanon, alluding to cash couriers.



13. (S/NF) A partner in the war on terror, the UAE continues to provide U.S. forces access, overflight clearances, and other critical logistical assistance to Operation Iraqi Freedom (and Operation Enduring Freedom). The UAE has also been a helpful supporter of Iraq's burgeoning political process. It has worked with Iraqi political and religious figures to encourage greater Sunni integration, and it has consulted with Ambassador Khalilzad on a number of occasions about the need to stem sectarianism in Iraq. The UAE has publicly condemned acts of sectarian and terrorist violence in Iraq, most recently, the February 22 bombing of the al-Askariya Shrine. MbZ and Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid expressed their concerns about Iran's interference in Iraq's internal affairs to Secretary Rice during her visit to Abu Dhabi February 23. MbZ further told General Abizaid that discontent with Iraqi Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Ja'afari was creating volunteers for al-Qaida. He pledged the UAE's support to the fight against al-Qaida. In his meeting with A/S Welch, MbZ advocated using the Arabic language media to tell Iraqis the truth about how many of their own people are dying at the hands of the insurgents. If Iraqis were to see the figures, he opined, they would conclude that support of the insurgency is "not worth it."

Ideological Extremism


14. (S) MbZ and his brothers continue to be outspoken on the issue of Muslim extremists and the threat they pose to the region. MbZ underscored for A/S Welch the UAE's preferred approach of denying extremists a foothold rather than allowing them to play a role in the political process. Although he warns of the dangers of free elections in countries with a well-organized Muslim Brotherhood presence, he tells USG guests that the UAE will go ahead with elections. The Emirati leadership has told us that they will not allow Islamists to participate in elections. (Note: The UAE has announced that half of the members of the Federal National Council would be elected while half would continue to be appointed by the rulers of the various emirates. Despite this announcement, the UAE still lags behind other Gulf states in terms of democratization. End Note.) MbZ also sees extremist ideology threatening the educational system, where he and his brothers are spending considerable resources to modernize the curriculum and the teaching corps. SISON

US embassy cables: Azerbaijan leader in the soup

  1. A coarse joke about political rivalry between Russia's president, Dmitry Medvedev, and its prime minister, Vladimir Putin, told to American diplomats may land Azerbaijan's leader, Ilam Aliyev, in trouble next time he meets one or both leaders. Key passage highlighted in yellow.

  2. Read relevant article

Thursday, 25 February 2010, 08:15

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BAKU 000134


EO 12958 DECL: 02/24/2020




Classified By: Charge Donald Lu, for reasons 1.4 (b,d).

1. (C) Summary: President Aliyev used this coarse street slang to describe the relationship between Russian President Medvedev and PM Putin, but he might well have used the same idiom to describe his concerns about Turkey-Armenia reconciliation and the Nagorno-Karabakh (NK) Peace Process. He told U/S Burns that the "Sword of Damocles" of the April 24 Armenian Remembrance Day is hanging over the NK Process, as well as the Turkey-Armenia normalization process. He suggested that it would be easier if the Turkey-Armenia normalization could be considered after April in order to allow more time for progress on NK. He also took the opportunity to press the USG to apply maximum pressure on Yerevan to make concessions on NK. He stressed, "Now we are trying to be even more flexible."

2. (C) Summary Continued: On Iran, President Aliyev said he supported economic isolation and believed it could be effective if enforced by a broad coalition. He complained about Iranian security provocations. On a proposed battalion-sized Afghanistan contribution, Aliyev said that he would support sending a team to Georgia to observe the training being provided by EUCOM to Georgian troops headed for Afghanistan. On energy cooperation, President Aliyev said that if the Turks demonstrate "constructive behavior" this year that a gas transit deal can happen. Finally, on the jailed youth activists, though he made no firm commitments regarding their release, he said, "I think (a pardon or amnesty) can be done. I had no intention to hurt anyone." End Summary.

Seeks Pressure on Yerevan to Resolve NK


3. (C) Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Bill Burns began his hour-long meeting with President Ilham Aliyev by stressing that he was sent with the simple message that Washington wants to build our bilateral relations and create a stronger partnership. He then offered his condolences for the three Azeri soldiers killed on the Line of Contact on February 18. Aliyev responded that such events show that there is no peace, no peace treaty and no peacekeepers enforcing the cease-fire. He worried more such incidents could happen. Burns commented that such incidents underscored the urgency of finding a political solution on Nagorno-Karabakh.

4. (C) The balance of Aliyev,s comments sought to convey that he was ready to move forward in the Minsk Group Process, but that international pressure would be needed if Armenia was to move forward. He said that it is now time to find a final resolution, but Armenian President Sargsian wants to walk away from the process. "I told the co-chairs that Armenia wants to delay as long as possible and escape at the end."" He said that Azerbaijan was prepared to do its part to propel the talks forward. "Now we will try to be even more flexible."

5. (C) Aliyev outlined several steps to persuade Armenia to agree to the Minsk Group Basic Principles:

-- the three co-chair countries should consolidate their efforts at a senior-level,

-- (C) the three co-chair countries should send a strong message that the independence of NK is not under review, and

-- (C) if these new proposals are not accepted, there should be consequences in terms of international isolation, especially in the form of Russia,s curtailing some of its economic support for Armenia.

6. (C) Aliyev noted that at Sochi, President Sargsian had inserted a proposal for specifying a definite date for a referendum or plebiscite on NK final status. This, Aliyev argued, undermined the entire framework of the agreement, which is premised on an eventual referendum ) with no definite timeframe ) in exchange for legalizing "the illegally established regime in NK."" He also noted that Armenia is vulnerable to isolation because it is dependent upon remittances from its diaspora, as well as imports of gas and electricity. "After 18 years of negotiation, we have tested all options. If this phase (of Minsk Group talks) ends, what is next?" the President asked aloud.

The Russian Role in NK and Russian Succession

BAKU 00000134 002 OF 004


7. (C) In response to U/S Burns' question about the Russian role in the NK talks, Aliyev responded that he was convinced that Medvedev's efforts have been sincere. He said that Medvedev has personally met with the Azerbaijani and Armenian presidents five times. Thus any failure to make progress on this issue will damage Medvedev's credibility. He said that at Sochi, Medvedev tried to persuade Sargsian to achieve a breakthrough. He added, however, that it was strange that with so much pressure from Moscow and Lavrov's visit to Yeveran, the Armenians not only resisted progress, but actually backtracked on previously-agreed items. In response to a question, Aliyev said that he believes that PM Putin has his own separate opinion about the desirability of an NK resolution. "I have no evidence, but I can feel this," Aliyev remarked.

8. (C) Aliyev said that he considers Medvedev "a modern, new-generation intellectual," surrounded by people whom he does not control. He said that he has personally witnessed Medvedev taking decisions that then required further approval before they were implemented, referring specifically to a border demarcation agreement that he had agreed with Medvedev only to have it stymied by ""others,"" presumably in the prime ministerial office. He added, "Many high-ranking officials don't recognize (Medvedev) as a leader." He said that there are signs of a strong confrontation between the teams of the two men, although not yet between Putin and Medvedev personally. "We have a saying in Azeri, 'Two heads cannot be boiled in one pot'" (crude street slang suggesting that two leaders are spoiling for a fight).

Strong Pushback on the Turkey-Armenia Normalization

--------------------------------------------- -------

9. (C) U/S Burns stressed that the U.S. believes that progress on the Turkey-Armenia protocols could create political space for Sargsian to be more flexible on NK. He continued that the reverse was also true, that a failure of the Turkey-Armenia process would almost certainly result in serious negative consequences for the NK process. Aliyev said that NK progress would require a minimum of five or six months. He suggested that the entire Turkey-Armenia protocol ratification process be delayed until after April 24. He said that the "Sword of Damocles" of Armenian Remembrance Day is hanging unhelpfully not only over the Turkey-Armenia process, but also now the NK progress. "If there were no deadline, maybe we could see how to combine our efforts (to resolve NK)."

10. (C) Aliyev pushed back with his usual warnings about the negative effects of Turkey-Armenia protocol ratification without being proceeded by NK progress. He darkly predicted postponement of any NK settlement; no comprehensive regional security improvement; damage to Turkey-Azerbaijani relations; no real partnership between Turkey and Armenia; further isolation of Central Asia; the undermining of energy projects; and damage to Georgia, both in lost transit income, but also in its role as the sole land corridor between Russia and Armenia.

Relations with Iran Described as Tense and Unstable

--------------------------------------------- ------

11. (C) U/S Burns explained in detail the steps the U.S. had taken to initiate dialogue with Tehran and support the Tehran Research Reactor initiative. He ended by noting that, given the rejection of these overtures, the U.S. would move forward with another UNSC resolution that included new sanctions targeting the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps. Aliyev responded that although the visible side of Azerbaijan's relations with Iran appears normal, the substance was very different. "I do not exclude that relations will be become more difficult," the President added.

12. (C) "(German Chancellor) Merkel was very firm with me on Iran, trying to persuade me. I told her, 'No need,'" the President recalled. He said that he was supportive of Iran's economic isolation and believed it could work if the international community worked together. He said that earlier sanctions observance had been spotty with many European energy companies working in Iran. "Statoil supports Iran more than it supports us!" he complained. He noted that Russian President Medvedev once told him that Russia did not want the Americans to squeeze Iran, but also did not want a nuclear Iran.

BAKU 00000134 003 OF 004

13. (C) Aliyev said that Iranian provocations in Azerbaijan were on the rise. He specifically cited not only the financing of radical Islamic groups and Hezbollah terrorists, but also:

-- the Iranian financing of violent Ashura ceremonies in Nakhchivan,

-- the organization of demonstrations in front of the Azeri consulates in Tabriz and Istanbul,

-- a violent religious procession recently in Baku,

-- the use of the President's photo alongside the Star of David on the Azeri-language Seher TV broadcast into Azerbaijan, and

-- conflict in the Caspian.

14. (C) The President added that Azerbaijan will not reciprocate on the liberalization of the visa regime with Iran. He also noted that Azerbaijan is planning to create a TV channel in Persian that will broadcast into Iran. He said that he did not understand why the Supreme Religious Leader chose Ahmadinejad over former President Moussavi. He joked that perhaps it was too dangerous to have two ethnic Azeris at the head of the Iranian state. He said that the election fraud was outrageous, with Ahmadinejad winning in Azeri-dominated Tabriz and Moussavi winning in Tehran, where it was harder to falsify the vote. He viewed the situation as very tense within Iran and believed it could erupt at any time.

Supports Afghanistan Troop Contribution, with Conditions

--------------------------------------------- -----------

15. (C) U/S Burns asked for the President's support to continue our discussions about a battalion-sized contribution of troops to Afghanistan that would include a U.S. train and equip program. The President said that he is aware of this initiative and his foreign and defense ministries are working on it. He said that the fundamental problem is one of ""optics,"" claiming it was difficult for him politically if it looks like the Americans are only training Azeri troops to send them off to Afghanistan. He said that it would be easier if half of those trained would be sent to Afghanistan, while the second half would remain in Azerbaijan or be used for other purposes. U/S Burns noted that the President's suggestion would create problems involving the U.S. funding of the training. The Charge proposed that as an initial step, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Defense Ministry staff observe the training of Georgian troops headed to Afghanistan by U.S. Marines. The President thought this was a good idea and instructed his aide to look at this suggestion.

Pardon or Amnesty of the Youth Activists "Can be Done"

--------------------------------------------- ---------

16. (C) U/S Burns said that one of the ways Azerbaijan could show leadership as a tolerant and secular country was in advancing democracy and human rights. He specifically asked that, following the appeal process of the two youth activists, the President find a way on humanitarian grounds to release the two men. Aliyev made no firm commitment, but responded, "I think this can be done. I had no intention to hurt anyone." When U/S Burns expressed the hope that the government could quietly take this step, the President said, "Okay."

Russians are a Factor in Turkish Gas Transit


17. (C) On energy cooperation, President Aliyev said that if the Turks demonstrate "constructive behavior" this year that a gas transit deal can happen. He was clear, however, that nothing would be signed before April 24. He also professed to be worried that active Turkish-Russian cooperation could be one of the impediments to progress. He confided that Turkish Energy Minister Yildiz recently told the head the Azerbaijani State Oil Company, "Why do you want to ruin our relations with Russia? Do you really need Nabucco?"

18. (C) The President continued that it is imperative for Azerbaijan that formalities for the commencement of Shah Deniz Phase II gas development begin this year. This project will bring $20 billion in much-needed investment to Azerbaijan and potentially develop Azerbaijan into a major source of new gas, as much as 50 billion cubic meters.

BAKU 00000134 004 OF 004

19. (C) Unprompted by U/S Burns, Aliyev spelled out the reasons Azerbaijan decided to sell gas to Russia last year, noting that ""Moscow had asked" and offered a good price for gas that was surplus anyway. But the real reason, Aliyev confided, was that the sale illustrated to "our Turkish friends" that they will not be allowed to create a gas distribution hub. "Aliyev made clear his distaste for the Erdogan government in Turkey, underscoring the "naivete" of their foreign policy and the failure of their initiatives, including the loss of support for Turkey among traditional international friends because of Ankara,s hostility to Israel. He noted that in his view, there had never been any merit to the notion of a "moderate Islamist" government in Turkey, and that Erdogan,s insistence on promoting Hamas and Gaza ) when other Arab countries were notably silent on these issues ) had brought Turkey no benefits.

20. (U) Lastly, U/S Burns asked for the President's assistance in resolving the long-standing difficulties in finalizing the lease for the new Embassy compound. The President responded positively that he thought this could be done.

21. (U) U/S Burns was accompanied by EUR Deputy Assistant Secretary Amb. Tina Kaidanow, NSC Director Bridget Brink, and Charge. President Aliyev was joined by his Foreign Policy Advisor Novruz Mammadov.

22. (U) This message has been cleared by U/S Burns. LU

US embassy cables: US shows interest in Alan Duncan

  1. Washington thanks London embassy for information on shadow minister for prisons Alan Duncan and request more on his relationships with David Cameron and William Hague, and his political ambitions. Key passage highlighted in yellow.

  2. Read related article
Friday, 22 January 2010, 13:29
C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 006439
EO 12958 DECL: 01/22/2035
REF: LONDON 002656





2. (U) PLEASE CITE C-RE9-02552 IN THE SUBJECT LINE OF REPORTING IN RESPONSE TO THE ABOVE QUESTIONS. CLINTON is a website which provides an easy way to search through the Iraq and Afghan War Logs, which were made public by Wikileaks on 22nd October 2010. The documents are a set of over 391,000 reports which

cover the war in Iraq from 2004 to 2009 and Afghanistan from 2004 to 2009.

From here, you can browse through all of the documents that have been released, organized by type, category, date, number of casualties, and many other properties. From any document page, clicking on the green underlined text will open

a popup that links to other documents that contain those phrases, making it possible to see important search terms and connections that you might not otherwise notice.

Our hope is that this tool will be helpful to reporters and researchers who are interested in learning more about the US's war in Afghanistan and making sense of this important database. If you wish to support this work, we encourage

you to make a donation to wikileaks.

Source code for this website is freely available on github – we welcome any contributions, improvements or suggestions.

On to the documents.

  • CACHE FOUND/CLEARED Other 2003-12-31 18:00:00
    AFG: Cache Found/Cleared, RC EAST, 0 casualties

    KAF-1BDE -S3 REPORTS: GERONIMO 11 SALUTE AS FOLLOWS: S - 1 CAVE, A CACHE, L - 42 SWB758 778, U UNK, T 0641, E - 1X UXO, 2000RDS 7.62MM....

  • IZ RUNS TCP BY /%%% IN ZONE %%%: NO INJURIES 2003-12-31 18:00:00
    iraq: Accident, MND-BAGHDAD, 0 casualties


  • CACHE FOUND/CLEARED Other 2003-12-31 18:00:00
    AFG: Cache Found/Cleared, RC EAST, 0 casualties


  • PROPAGANDA Other 2003-12-31 18:00:00
    AFG: Propaganda, RC SOUTH, 0 casualties


  • DIRECT FIRE Other 2003-12-31 18:00:00
    AFG: Direct Fire, RC EAST, 3 casualties


  • DIRECT FIRE Other 2003-12-31 18:00:00
    AFG: Direct Fire, RC EAST, 8 casualties


  • ACM''S WERE KIA....

  • A /%%% and local car have been involved in a RTA. No any CAS were reported. 2003-12-31 18:10:00
    iraq: Accident, MND-SE, 0 casualties

    A /%%% and local car have been involved in a RTA. No any CAS were reported. Imported MND-SE Report Event ID:%%% Number of Rounds: Number of Blinds: Number inside the Wire: : : %%%: ...

  • /%%% INVOLVED IN TRAFFIC ACCIDENT: NO INJURIES 2003-12-31 18:10:00
    iraq: Accident, MND-SE, 0 casualties


  • SAF ATTACK ON CAMP %%% GUARD TOWER IN BAGHDAD (ZONE %%%) - NO BDA 2003-12-31 18:20:00
    iraq: Direct Fire, MND-BAGHDAD, 0 casualties


  • %%% CONDUCTS RAID VIC BALAD: %%% DETAINED 2003-12-31 20:00:00
    iraq: Raid, MND-N, 0 casualties



US embassy cables: China urged to stop shipment of missile parts for Iran

  1. Condoleezza Rice instructs the US ambassador in Beijing to raise "at the highest level possible" that Chinese authorities should halt a delivery from North Korea of Iran of missile components that could be used on a nuclear bomb. Key passages highlighted in yellow.

  2. Read related article
Saturday, 03 November 2007, 05:03
S E C R E T STATE 152317
EO 12958 DECL: 10/31/2027
REF: (A)STATE 071143, (B)STATE 073601, (C)STATE 72896, (D)BEIJING 5361, (E) STATE 148514





2. (S/REL CHINA) Post should:

--(This point for November 3 Delivery) Request China to stop an imminent shipment to Iran's ballistic missile program. This is the same cargo that the Ambassador shared about on October 25 (ref E). It is now scheduled to leave Beijing airport on November 4.

--(This point for November 3 Delivery) Note the importance of this demarche since it relates to a topic discussed by Presidents Bush and Hu in Sydney. Embassy should further note that the Embassy will be seeking an appointment at the highest level possible to convey a more extensive presentation on this topic of ballistic missile parts from North Korea to Iran.

--Remind Chinese officials that President Bush has been personally engaged on the issue of the transshipment of ballistic missile parts between North Korea and Iran via Beijing and that he raised this issue with President Hu at the APEC Summit.

-- Seek information on the steps China has taken since the APEC discussion to address this issue and impress on them the necessity for China to take immediate strong action.

-- Stress that the credibility of UN Security Council actions must be maintained by vigorous implementation by UN Member States of UNSC resolutions calling for Chapter VII sanctions, particularly 1718, 1737, and 1747.

--Indicate that the U.S. believes that the proliferation of missile technology between North Korea and Iran will increase and that these two countries will attempt to conduct these transfers through Chinese territory.

--Emphasize the need to inspect cargo and personal goods on regularly scheduled flights transiting Beijing from North Korea to Iran in order to detect and deter these shipments.

--Explain to Chinese officials that the U.S. carefully reviews the intelligence material that we have on shipments before we share it, and we ask that Chinese authorities respect this and act on our information accordingly and appropriately.

--Indicate that the United States believes that we can work together cooperatively and effectively on these issues.

--Express our willingness to continue to share as much information as possible to assist China's efforts to uphold these UN Security Council resolutions.

--------------------------------------------- -------------

Background: Ballistic Missile Parts Shipped via Beijing Between North Korea and Iran.

--------------------------------------------- -------------

3. (S/Rel China) Iran and North Korea have continued their longstanding cooperation on ballistic missile technology, via air- shipments of ballistic-missile related items. We assess that some of these shipments consist of ballistic missile jet vanes that frequently transit Beijing on regularly scheduled flights on Air Koryo and Iran Air. We believe that the Shahid Bagheri Industrial Group (SBIG) is the probable end user for these parts. SBIG is listed in the annex to UNSCR 1737 and these jet vanes are controlled under Item 10.A.2 of the Missile Technology Control Regime and Item 6 of China's missile- related export control regulations. Moreover, UNSCRs 1718 and 1737 prohibit the transfer to or from North Korea or Iran, respectively, of jet vanes and any other item listed in UNSC document S/2006/815. These shipments therefore represent violations of UNSCRs 1718 and 1737.

4. (S/Rel China) The U.S. has raised this issue with China at the highest levels several times in the last few months. In May 2007, the United States informed China of imminent shipments on three separate occasions (Refs A,B and C). Though Chinese officials informed Embassy Beijing that China's investigations have found no evidence of these transfers, it appears that these shipments did occur and are continuing to transit via Beijing. In addition this issue was raised by ISN PDAS Patricia McNerney during bilateral nonproliferation talks in August 2007 (Ref D). The Deputy Secretary also raised this issue with Executive Vice Foreign Minister (EVFM) Dai Bingguo via during a telephone conversation in August. Finally, in September 2007, President Bush discussed this issue with Chinese President Hu at the APEC summit in Sydney. The two leaders agreed that the USG would provide the PRC with further information on these transfers.

5. (S/Rel China) On October 25 the U.S. provided PRC officials with detailed information, including the airway bill and flight number, of another imminent shipment of military related goods from North Korea to Iran via Beijing. This shipment was also assessed as destined for Iran's solid propellant missile development organization, the Shahid Bagheri Industries Group (SBIG). We now have information that the goods will be shipped on November 4 and insist on a substantive response from China to this information.

6. (S/Rel China) Our information indicates that at least 10 air shipments of jet vanes have transited Beijing thus far and that these shipments will not only continue but will also grow in volume. We have encouraged the Chinese to undertake frequent inspections of cargo on Air Koryo or Iran Air flights transiting Beijing from North Korea to both deter and detect these shipments.

7. (S/Rel China) The Department is seeking both immediate action on this new information and a strategic approach with regards to this critical issue. We assess that the best way to prevent these shipments in the future is for Chinese authorities to take action, such as those identified in para 9, that will make the Beijing airport a less hospitable transfer point.

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8. (S/Rel China) Begin points:

-- Last week we raised with you information regarding North Korean plans to send a shipment, probably for Iran's ballistic missile program, to Iran. We believe the cargo is intended for Iran's Shahid Bagheri Industrial Group (SBIG), which is responsible for Iran's solid-propellant ballistic missile program. You had requested additional information.

-- We now have reason to believe that the items above will be shipped to Iran via scheduled Iran Air flight on November 4.

--If these goods are missile-related, North Korea is prohibited under UNSCR 1718 from exporting missile-related items and UN Member States are prohibited from importing those items. In addition, North Korea would potentially be precluded under UNSCR 1737 from transferring these items to Iran if they are among the missile-related components included in S/2006/815 or if North Korea or China determines that they would contribute to the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems. Moreover, SBIG is designated in United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1737 and, as such, is subject to the mandatory asset freeze called for in the resolution. With these concerns in mind we are asking that Chinese authorities investigate this shipment and prohibit it from proceeding to Iran.




9. (S/REL CHINA) Begin Points:

--Over the past several months we have raised with Chinese officials the problem of ballistic missile-related transfers between Iran and North Korea being transshipped through China. President Bush raised U.S. concerns on this matter with President Hu during the APEC summit in Sydney, demonstrating the importance of the issue to the United States. In response to President Hu's request for additional details, we are providing you further information regarding these activities. Specifically, we are urgently providing information regarding an imminent shipment of serious concern.

-- North Korea is prohibited under UNSCR 1718 from exporting missile- related items and UN Member States are prohibited from importing those items. In addition, North Korea would potentially be precluded under UNSCR 1737 from transferring these items to Iran if they are among the missile-related components included in S/2006/815 or if North Korea or China determines that they would contribute to the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems. Moreover, SBIG is designated in United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1737 and, as such, is subject to the mandatory asset freeze called for in the resolution. With these concerns in mind we are insisting that Chinese authorities urgently investigate this shipment and prohibit it from proceeding to Iran.

--We are very concerned that North Korean shipments of jet vanes occur on regularly scheduled commercial air flights transiting through Beijing. We believe this has been the case on about 10 flights.

--These items are likely intended for Iran's solid propellant missile development organization, the Shahid Bagheri Industries Group (SBIG).

--These cargo shipments probably include front companies.

--We have identified a large number of shipments beginning late last year of what are probably ballistic missile-related items that have transited Beijing, and we would like to share further information on these shipments.

--[DETAILS REMOVED] December 2006: A delegation from SBIG returned from Pyongyang probably via Beijing and transported what we assess to be jet vanes for a solid propellant medium range ballistic missile (MRBM) under development in Iran.

--On or about [DETAILS REMOVED] January 2007: North Korea delivered what were probably jet vanes for Iran's developmental solid propellant MRBM to SBIG via Beijing on board regularly-scheduled commercial passenger flights.

--On or around [DETAILS REMOVED] January 2007: North Korea delivered what were probably jet vanes for Iran's developmental solid propellant MRBM to SBIG via Beijing on board regularly-scheduled commercial passenger flights.

--On or about [DETAILS REMOVED] May 2007: An air shipment composed of four what were probably jet vanes from North Korea to Iran for SBIG was scheduled to depart North Korea and transit Beijing via regularly-scheduled commercial passenger flights.

--On or about [DETAILS REMOVED] May 2007: An air shipment composed of five what were probably jet vanes from North Korea to Iran for SBIG was scheduled to depart North Korea and transit Beijing via regularly-scheduled commercial passenger flights.

--On or about [DETAILS REMOVED] June 2007: An air shipment composed of four what were probably jet vanes from North Korea to Iran for SBIG was scheduled to depart North Korea and transit Beijing via regularly-scheduled commercial passenger flights.

-- On or about [DETAILS REMOVED] June 2007: An air shipment composed of five what were probably jet vanes from North Korea to Iran for SBIG was scheduled to depart North Korea and transit Beijing via regularly- scheduled commercial passenger flights.

--On or about [DETAILS REMOVED] June 2007: An air shipment composed of three what were probably jet vanes from North Korea to Iran for SBIG was scheduled to depart North Korea and transit Beijing via regularly- scheduled commercial passenger flights.

--On or about [DETAILS REMOVED] July 2007: An air shipment composed of ten what were probably jet vanes from North Korea to Iran for SBIG was scheduled to depart North Korea and transit Beijing via regularly-scheduled commercial passenger flights.

--On or about [DETAILS REMOVED] July 2007: An air shipment possibly composed of an unknown number of jet vanes from North Korea to Iran for SBIG was scheduled to depart North Korea and transit Beijing via regularly- scheduled commercial passenger flights.

--On or about [DETAILS REMOVED] August: An air shipment possibly composed of one jet vane from North Korea to Iran for SBIG was scheduled to depart North Korea and transit Beijing via regularly-scheduled commercial passenger flights.

--We believe that the number of jet vanes sent to Iran will increase dramatically in the future.

--To date we believe that about 40 probable jet vanes have been sent from North Korea to Iran.

--The contract for these components called for a total number of 500 and we assess that shipments of these may increase to a rate of 100- 160 per month.

--In addition, our information indicates that a second order of 1,500 components - possibly additional jet vanes - was agreed to in December of last year.

-- We believe that this trade will continue to utilize regularly- scheduled commercial passenger flights.

--As we have discussed on several occasions, Iran also has been seeking probable tungsten-copper alloy plates from China's Dalian Sunny Industries, also known as LIMMT. Dalian Sunny Industries shipped part of an order for this material in September. These plates are suitable for Iranian domestic production of jet vanes or as an insulator for ballistic missile components. Iran could be seeking these plates in case North Korea is unable to provide the quantity or quality of jet vanes required.

--We urge you to prevent such shipments via whatever action you deem appropriate, including frequent inspection of [NAMES REMOVED] flights. The use of regularly-scheduled commercial passenger flights indicates that frequent regular inspections of [NAMESREMOVED] flights are in order and would help deter these shipments in the future.

--We will continue to provide you with relevant information to help end this proliferation.


Reporting Requirement and POC


10. (U) Please report delivery of cable and any immediate response by November 8, 2007.

11. (U) Washington point-of-contact for follow-up information is Matthew Zartman (202) 647-7588 begin_of_the_skype_highlighting            (202) 647-7588      end_of_the_skype_highlighting, Please slug all responses for ISN, T, and EAP. Washington appreciates Post's assistance.


US embassy cables: How to handle a defector - a how-to guide for embassy staff

  1. Washington issued a directive on how to deal with a "walk-in" defector. Key advice includes caution if they claim they are carrying evidence of weapons of mass destruction; quickly copying their identification documents in case they get cold feet and run off; and not promising too much in terms of residency in the US. Key passage highlighted in yellow.

  2. Read related article
Wednesday, 18 November 2009, 17:29
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 11 STATE 119085
EO 12958 DECL: 11/17/2034
REF: (A) 08 STATE 061194 (B) 7 FAM 180 (C) 09 STATE 030541 (D) 04 STATE 061816 (E) 2 FAM 227 (F) 08 STATE 110175 (G) 09 STATE 110904 (H) 9 FAM 42.1 N4, PN2-5, and PN7

(U) Classified by: David Appleton, Director, INR/CCS, Reason: 1.4 (c, d).


1. (S/NF) This telegram replaces Ref A as the Department's comprehensive guidance on handling foreign national walk-ins, defectors, and asylum seekers - all of whom are generally referred to in this telegram as "walk-ins." This telegram was coordinated with interagency partners, including CIA, DHS, DIA, and the FBI. It explains the procedures for receiving walk-ins; determining whether they are of intelligence value and whether defector, temporary refuge, protection, resettlement, parole, or other status is appropriate; and coordinating an appropriate response. A link to this telegram will be included in the Chief of Mission (COM) Guide on ClassNet ( (For guidance on handling U.S. citizens requesting emergency protection ("temporary refuge") at posts, see Ref B.)

2. (S/NF) COMs should ensure that all post personnel are properly prepared to handle walk-ins. Post management, RSO, and GRPO have the most responsibility for ensuring proper handling of walk-ins, but other officers may play critical roles.

3. (S/NF) Correct handling of walk-ins is important for three principal reasons. Walk-ins (1) may be sources of invaluable intelligence; (2) pose numerous security challenges; and (3) may need protection. Improper handling of walk-ins can put them and post personnel at risk and result in the loss of important intelligence. Thus, post's procedures must be clear, well-understood, and workable at any hour, day or night.

4. (U) Questions or comments regarding the guidance in this telegram should normally be directed by telegram to INR/CCS, which will coordinate a Department response. If additional guidance is required in an emergency walk-in situation, however, post should contact the Department's Operations Center (202-647-1512 begin_of_the_skype_highlighting            202-647-1512      end_of_the_skype_highlighting), which will alert the appropriate Department personnel.

5. (U) This telegram contains the following sections:

A. - Storage and dissemination of this telegram (paragraph 6) B. - Post preparation for handling walk-ins (paragraphs 7-23) C. - Procedures for handling walk-in arrivals (paragraphs 24-33) D. - Requirements for reporting on walk-ins (paragraphs 34-39) E. - Temporary refuge guidance and cautions (paragraphs 40-52) F. - Long-term options for walk-ins(paragraphs 53- 63) G. - Travel assistance for walk-ins(paragraphs 64- 65)



6. (U) Posts should retain this telegram in the RSO's files and in a location accessible to duty officers, replacing and destroying Ref A and any other prior versions. RSOs should ensure that all officers have read this telegram and know where it is retained.


7. (S/NF) Each post's Counterintelligence Working Group (CIWG) should meet upon receipt of this telegram to review post's procedures for dealing with walk-ins. The CIWG should ensure that post's procedures are consistent with the guidance in this telegram and local security concerns, include appropriate defensive security measures, and allow screened walk-ins to meet securely with appropriate post officials.

8. (S/NF) Post's walk-ins procedures should include (1) special procedures for the reception of embassy (including consular section) walk-ins of possible intelligence value; (2) procedures for constituent posts, if any; and (3) procedures for approaches at residences, in vehicles, on the street, via telephone, and through both electronic and hand-delivered mail. Heightened security at USG installations increases the possibility of approaches to USG officials outside USG facilities. Because of the inherent risks, however, post procedures should permit arranging substantive meetings outside post only in exceptional circumstances and only after approval of the COM based on the recommendations of the RSO and GRPO.

9. (S/NF) Post's procedures must allow for appropriately balancing the following considerations which may come into play in walk-in cases:

(a) post security; (b) the safety of the individual; (c) the intelligence value and bona fides of the individual; (d) whether the individual requires protection and, if so, whether appropriate protection is available from international organizations or host-country sources; (e) whether the individual should be resettled outside the host-country and, if so, whether resettlement in another country or the United States is possible; (f) the time available for resolution of the case; and (g) the need to safeguard the confidentiality of any information that may have a bearing on a future consular-related activity or possible resettlement request.

10. (S/NF) Post's procedures must be cleared by the RSO and coordinated with the GRPO and, at posts with an FBI Legal Attache (LEGATT), with the LEGATT. (All three should be on post's CIWG.) Post's RSO should update post's walk-in plan with the GRPO and LEGATT, if any, on a semi-annual basis or as needed.

11. (S/NF) RSOs should ensure that all relevant potential participants in handling walk-ins are appropriately briefed and trained. Non-cleared personnel can be told that a USG official will interview walk-ins, because that fact is not classified. The fact that a walk-in may be referred to other post officials for a decision on further actions is classified and may not be shared with non-cleared personnel. All briefings should emphasize the importance of ensuring that the walk- in is fully screened, but should also convey that legitimate walk-ins may exhibit nervous or anxious behavior, particularly because access controls and host nation security forces around many of our diplomatic posts make it difficult for walk-ins to approach our facilities discreetly. All briefings should also stress the importance of not drawing attention to the walk-in or alerting host nation security personnel.

12. (S/NF) RSO briefings should include (1) briefing those who may have first contact with a walk-in - including non-USG local guards and receptionists - on the procedures to follow at first contact; (2) providing additional briefings to MSGs, other USG security personnel, and USG duty officers on a semi-annual basis or as needed on more sensitive aspects of the program; (3) briefing consular officers on handling walk-ins who approach through a consular service window; and (4) briefing all arriving cleared USG personnel on the procedures for approaches that occur off post premises (as part of the arrival briefing).

13. (S/NF) To ensure that walk-ins can communicate their wishes clearly, post may wish to prepare language cards that can be shown at first contact to a walk-in who does not speak English, giving options from which the walk-in can select. One option should be "I wish to speak with an American official." Other options should be plausible alternatives, such as "I wish to obtain information about travel requirements." In addition to the local language, post should consider having such cards available in priority interest languages such as Russian, Spanish, Arabic, Farsi, Mandarin, and Korean, as appropriate in light of the local environment.

14. (S/NF) The RSO should incorporate post's procedures into the MSG and local guard orders as necessary.

15. (S/NF) Posts should designate a room, preferably outside the Public Access Control (PAC) hard-line, for conducting the initial interview of a walk-in.

16. (S/NF) Post should have an interview guide that can be used during the initial interview, and should maintain a current roster of cleared USG personnel who can provide interpretation services to assist the RSO and others in interviewing walk- ins as required.

17. (S/NF) Post procedures should clearly identify the officer who will do the initial interview of a walk-in, and a backup for when that officer is absent. (These are normally the RSO and Assistant RSO.) These officials should have a prearranged signal and appropriate contact numbers for notifying GRPO of a walk-in of possible intelligence value.

18. (S/NF) MSGs, local guards, and receptionists should have a codeword or pre-arranged signal to alert the RSO (or other designated officer) of a person requesting to speak with a U.S. officer.

19. (U) Post should verify that current phone numbers, addresses, and directions for host government offices that handle refugee claims and the local offices of the UNHCR and UNDP are included in post's walk-in procedures and the duty officer handbook. This information should also be readily available as a handout for walk-ins.

20. (U) Post procedures should contain current information on the host government's legal obligations towards persons claiming to be refugees or to be in danger of being tortured. These obligations may arise from the host country's domestic law and/or treaty obligations. States party to the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, its 1967 Protocol, and the 1969 African Union Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa have agreed not to expel or return refugees, as defined in those instruments, from their territory under certain circumstances. States party to the 1987 Convention Against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment have agreed not to expel or return an individual from their territory to another country where there are substantial grounds for believing that he/she would be in danger of being subjected to torture.

21. (S/NF) RSO and GRPO should coordinate any operational tests of walk-in procedures.

22. (S/NF) RSOs should review walk-in procedures with constituent posts and ensure that they are properly prepared to handle walk-ins. This should include ensuring that constituent post's procedures are also incorporated into local guard orders as necessary.

23. (S/NF) Posts without an RSO, GRPO, or UNHCR/UNDP presence in-country should promptly develop additional post-specific guidance to ensure that the guidance in this telegram is adjusted to fit their situation.


24. (S/NF) The MSG, local guard, receptionist, or other employee or official who first makes contact with the walk-in should ascertain whether the walk- in wishes to talk with the USG official, using the language cards as necessary. If so, they should use the pre-arranged signal to inform the USG official designated to deal with walk-ins (normally the RSO or Assistant RSO) as soon as possible. Posts with MSGs may wish to instruct non-USG local guards, receptionists, and others likely to be a walk-in's first point of contact to refer a walk-in who wishes to speak with a USG official to the MSG, and then have the MSG involve the RSO.

25. (C) Post's first priority must be to determine whether the individual is carrying a weapon, device, or hazardous material that endangers post personnel. Walk-ins must be screened and searched before being permitted within the security perimeter. If a walk-in possesses any object or item that appears suspicious or potentially hazardous, security personnel should deny access even if the walk-in presents the item as evidence of some intelligence he offers, e.g., red mercury presented as proof of plutonium enrichment. Security personnel are not required to prove that an object, item, or material is hazardous to refuse entry to the walk-in. Only DS-supplied and/or DS- approved instruments should be used to examine suspect material. Posts should follow established DS and Department procedures for screening and reporting suspect materials, e.g., white powder incidents. In the event post encounters material or information relating to alleged radioactive materials, please refer to Ref C for comprehensive interagency approved guidance.

26. (C) The walk-in's identification and/or travel documents should be copied as soon as the walk-in is screened in, if at all possible. Otherwise, the papers should be copied before the end of the walk- in's initial interview. Identifying and keeping records of walk-ins is important for security and intelligence reasons; copying their identity documents early is advisable because walk-ins may get cold feet and leave if kept waiting for an interview.

27. (S/NF) After the walk-in has been searched, the RSO or designated alternate must interview the walk-in, using post's interview guide. The RSO should attempt to establish the individual's bona fides. (Walk-ins may in fact be mentally disturbed persons, intelligence vendors, fabricators, provocateurs from hostile intelligence services, or persons gathering information on behalf of terrorist organizations.) Once the subject's bona fides are established to the RSO's satisfaction, the RSO should establish what the walk-in wants, whether the walk-in appears to be of possible intelligence or counterintelligence interest, how much time the walk-in has, and methods for future contact, among other information. The RSO must also attempt to determine whether the individual is in imminent danger, including (1) immediate physical danger, (2) danger of involuntary repatriation to a country where the individual's life or freedom would be threatened for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion, or (3) danger of involuntary repatriation to a country where it is more likely than not that the individual will be subjected to torture. Finally, the RSO may have reason to interview the individual for information regarding potential threats to USG personnel and facilities. (If such information is obtained, the RSO generally should advise the LEGATT and should consider flagging the individual for the Rewards for Justice Program.)

28. (S/NF) Monitoring of foreign nationals in walk-in rooms overseas is permitted only in accordance with guidelines set forth in Ref D. All other recording or monitoring conducted by post employees, including those in cover positions, must be consistent with the Department Notice of January 24, 1977 ("the Vance Memorandum"), which states that "No officer or employee of the State Department . . . shall direct, arrange for, permit, or undertake the monitoring or mechanical or electronic recording of any conversation, including any telephone conversation, without the express consent of all persons involved in the conversation," unless advance approval is granted by the Secretary or the Deputy Secretary of State. (Reproduced at Tab U, Special Agent's Legal Authorities, available at

29. (C) Post personnel should never leave a walk- in unattended. If possible, two or more post officials should work together during the interview phase.

30. (S/NF) If the RSO finds the walk-in credible and to be of possible foreign intelligence or counterintelligence interest, the RSO should follow post procedures to ensure transfer of the walk-in to the GRPO as quickly as possible with minimal exposure to other post personnel. The GRPO will determine further actions (interview, contact again at a later date, etc.).

31. (C) Post must strictly limit disclosure of the fact of any request for temporary refuge, departure from the host country, asylum in the United States, third-country visa assistance, issuance or refusal of visas or permits to enter the United States, and requests to resettle elsewhere. Only USG personnel with a need-to-know should be made aware of such requests.

32. (C) Post should provide no comment in response to press inquiries, unless otherwise instructed by the Department.

33. (C) Post must consult with the Department prior to responding to congressional inquiries on specific walk-in cases.


34. (S/NF) If a walk-in is of intelligence interest, the case will be handled by the Intelligence Community (IC) once that interest is established, and reporting on the case will occur in IC channels. Post must notify the Department of all/all cases not handled within the IC and involving the following, using the reporting channels described in paragraphs 37-39 below except where otherwise indicated:

(a) A person who may have information on immediate threats to USG personnel or facilities. See paragraph 35 below for reporting channel instructions. (b) A person who possesses information regarding plans and intentions of governments and/or organizations hostile to the United States. (c) A person who may have information on weapons proliferation, weapons of mass destruction, counterterrorism, counternarcotics, or any significant new intelligence or military-related subjects. (d) A foreign diplomat, foreign consular officer, other foreign government official (including members of the national police and the military), or political party official, regardless of his/her country of nationality. (e) A person who appears threatened by involuntary repatriation to a country where the person's life or freedom would be threatened for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion, or where it is more likely than not that the person would be tortured. See paragraph 36 below for reporting channel instructions. (f) Persons seeking resettlement (including "asylum") in the United States. See Section E (paragraphs 40-52) below and Ref E for additional guidance on such cases. (g) Persons granted temporary refuge. See paragraphs 50-52 for instructions on reporting such cases.

35. (S/NF) Security threat information reportable per paragraph 34(a) above should be reported via TERREP or TERREP exclusive channel telegram (as appropriate) as soon as possible. Threat information of an extremely urgent nature should be provided to the RSO and other appropriate post officials immediately and relayed to the DS Command Center (DSCC) at (571) 345-3146 begin_of_the_skype_highlighting            (571) 345-3146      end_of_the_skype_highlighting or via DSCC secure line at (571) 345-7793 begin_of_the_skype_highlighting            (571) 345-7793      end_of_the_skype_highlighting.

36. (S/NF) Cases involving threats of involuntary return as described in paragraph 34(e) above should be brought to the Department's attention immediately, by phone, email or cable slugged for PRM/A, with U.S. Mission Geneva, attention Refugee and Migration Affairs (RMA), as an info addressee.

37. (S/NF) Except as specified above for threat and involuntary return cases, telegrams should be sent through normal channels, be slugged for INR/CCS, P, DS/CI, and the appropriate regional bureau, and describe the time-sensitivity of the case. INR/CCS is the action office and will distribute to other bureaus as appropriate. In extremely sensitive cases, post should send a Roger Channel telegram to INR/CCS, which will ensure appropriate, limited distribution.

38. (S/NF) If the case may require consideration of U.S. resettlement options, posts may also wish to slug PRM/A, DRL/MLGA, L/HRR, and CA/VO, and to add DHS/USCIS WASHDC as an info addressee.

39. (S/NF) All telegrams should use the PINR and ASEC tags. CVIS and PREF tags also should be used in potential resettlement cases. All telegrams referring to UNHCR should add U.S. Mission Geneva, attention Refugee and Migration Affairs (RMA), as an info addressee.


40. (S/NF) Walk-ins sometimes request that they be permitted to remain in an embassy or other USG facility beyond closing hours. The Department considers this a request for temporary refuge, not a request for asylum, and post officials should be particularly careful not to equate the two. In U.S. immigration law, asylum is a status granted to qualified refugees, and an application for "asylum" can only be made in the United States. A walk-in may request "asylum" in an embassy based on the erroneous belief that safe passage out of the host country will be assured if the request is granted. While a few mostly Latin American countries recognize such a right of "diplomatic asylum," the United States and most other countries do not recognize that concept or accept that the granting of refuge in an embassy is an authorized use of diplomatic facilities. A walk-in who requests "asylum" may also in substance be requesting an opportunity to resettle in the United States; guidance on such requests is below under long-term options.

41. (S/NF) Granting a walk-in temporary refuge in an embassy or other USG facility may actually increase the danger to an individual, particularly in hostile countries and if the individual is a host-country national. The longer the person remains, the more likely the host government will become aware of the request for temporary refuge and possibly take retaliatory action. In hostile countries, the United States generally is unable either to assure a walk-in's safe conduct out of the country or continued safety in the country once they leave post premises. Thus granting temporary refuge may lead to a protracted stalemate, with the walk-in effectively residing in post premises. "Residence within a post" of persons hostile to the host government could be a continuing source of controversy and lead to serious adverse effects on U.S. interests and unexpected financial implications for the post.

42. (U) In light of these factors, all foreign national walk-ins seeking refuge in a USG facility should be informed that post cannot ensure (a) their safe conduct out of the host country; (b) their future safety within the host country; or (c) their entry into the United States. They should also be informed that they may actually endanger their own welfare or interests by remaining at post.

43. (S/NF) Temporary refuge may never be granted to foreign nationals who simply wish to immigrate to the United States or evade local criminal law; if granting refuge would put post security in jeopardy; or if the Department instructs post not to do so.

44. (S/NF) Post should use appropriate measures to remove a person seeking refuge from the premises when temporary refuge is not warranted.

45. (S/NF) Only the COM or Principal Officer, or a person designated to act on their behalf in their absence, may grant a request for temporary refuge.

46. (S/NF) Temporary refuge may be granted only if there is compelling evidence that the walk-in is in imminent physical danger for any reason, or in imminent danger of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.

47. (S/NF) Within the kinds of cases described in paragraph 46, post should grant temporary refuge in those rare situations in which an individual faces not just imminent physical danger, but immediate and exceptionally grave physical danger, i.e., possible death or serious bodily injury, either in the host country or in another country to which the individual will be summarily returned by host- country authorities.

48. (S/NF) Also within the kinds of cases described in paragraph 46, post may at its discretion grant temporary refuge if the physical danger or the danger of involuntary repatriation as defined above is less serious but appears imminent. In determining if granting temporary refuge is appropriate in such instances, post should consider the following questions:

(a) How serious and immediate is the threat to the walk-in? (b) Will the threat to the individual increase or decrease if the walk-in is allowed to remain at post? (c) Can the individual leave or be required to leave post without being noticed? (d) If detection by host government authorities is inevitable and the alleged threat is from the host government, can the walk-in's presence and subsequent departure be explained in a manner that will not further endanger the individual? (e) What are the likely consequences of allowing the individual to temporarily remain at the post with regards to the individual, other persons in the host country, the security of the post, and the safety of U.S. Government personnel? (f) Is the individual of intelligence value to the United States? (g) Is the person facing immediate and exceptionally grave physical danger on account of peaceful political, religious, or humanitarian activities consistent with U.S. values and policies?

49. (C/NF) Temporary refuge generally should not be granted at residential diplomatic or consular premises. The inviolability of diplomatic residences (except the COM's) is linked to the diplomat's residency and may be lost if the host government declares persona non grata (PNG) the diplomat whose residence is involved. Consular residences do not enjoy inviolability (unless it is provided by special agreement). As a practical matter all residences, whether diplomatic or consular, are generally less secure than the embassy or consulate.

50. (C) If temporary refuge is granted, post should notify the Department in an appropriately classified "NIACT Immediate" precedence telegram and should notify other relevant overseas posts by immediate precedence telegram. Telegrams to the Department should be slugged for INR/CCS, P, PRM/A, L/HRR, L/DL, DSCC, DRL/MLGA, CA/VO, and the appropriate regional bureau. DHS/USCIS WASHDC should be a direct telegraphic info addressee. Post also should notify the Department by telegram if temporary refuge is requested but denied, unless the case is clearly without merit, e.g., appeals by a drunken or deranged person.

51. (S/NF) If the host government (or the government of the alien's nationality, if the individual is a third-country national) requests an interview with a walk-in who is granted temporary refuge, post should notify the Department and await guidance. Post should not/not comply with such interview requests unless explicitly authorized to do so by the Department.

52. (SBU) If granted, temporary refuge should be terminated as soon as circumstances permit (e.g., when the period of active danger ends), but only with Department authorization. Post management should inform the Department (to the same addressees listed in paragraph 50) when temporary refuge is terminated. A person who has been granted temporary refuge may, of course, leave voluntarily whenever he/she wishes. Post management should reasonably ensure that the decision to leave is voluntary.


53. (U) Walk-ins often wish to resettle in the United States, but this may not be appropriate or possible. The United States encourages local or regional resettlement of refugees and international resettlement burden-sharing among many governments.

54. (C/NF) In routine cases involving walk-ins from third countries who may be refugees, the walk- in should be referred to the host government for adjudication of his or her status as long as the host country has satisfactory asylum or refugee- processing procedures. In most cases, potential refugees should also be referred to the local office of the UNHCR, especially if local refugee/asylum procedures are not available. UNHCR is mandated to provide protection for refugees and has primary international responsibility for seeking durable solutions for refugees, including possible opportunities for third-country resettlement. This mandate extends to UNHCR even in countries that are not party to any of the treaties just mentioned. Where there is no UNHCR office, UNHCR's responsibilities are normally handled by the local UNDP office. Beware, however, that in some countries UNHCR (or UNDP) may be placed in an awkward position if it is notified of a case and there is a need to conceal the case from the host government. If this possibility exists, post should approach UNHCR or UNDP discreetly.

55. (C/NF) If it appears that entry into the United States is the appropriate long-term solution to a walk-in's situation, the walk-in should not be issued a non-immigrant visa except in unusual circumstances after consultation with the Department. Non-immigrant admission will generally not be appropriate because the circumstances that lead an individual to become a walk-in normally lead also to ineligibility under section 214(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) as an intending immigrant. Admission to the United States therefore normally should be as a refugee or parolee. In some circumstances an immigrant visa may also be available.


56. (U) A person outside the United States may be granted refugee admission if he or she qualifies as a "refugee" as defined in U.S. law and meets other applicable requirements. DHS has sole responsibility for adjudicating applications for refugee admission outside the United States. DHS/USCIS officers determine whether or not an individual is a refugee on a case-by-case basis after a personal interview. To qualify, a person must normally be outside his country. Given adequate justification, however, DHS may adjudicate an "in country" refugee application when requested by a U.S. Ambassador with the concurrence of PRM/A and DHS/USCIS in Washington. See Ref F, entitled "How a post can refer cases to the U.S. refugee admissions program", and Ref G, entitled "Worldwide processing priority system for FY 2010", for more information.

57. (U) The U.S. definition of "refugee" encompasses a person who, under the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, is outside his or her country of nationality (or, if he or she has no nationality, the country of last habitual residence) and has experienced past persecution or has a well-founded fear of persecution in that country on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. U.S. law deems the following persons to have been persecuted on account of political opinion: a person who has been forced to abort a pregnancy or to undergo involuntary sterilization, or who has been persecuted for failure or refusal to undergo such a procedure, or for other resistance to a coercive population control program; a person who has a well-founded fear that he or she will be forced to undergo such a procedure or be persecuted for such failure, refusal, or resistance.

58. (U) Persons admitted to the United States as refugees are eligible for initial reception and placement assistance from non-government organizations (NGOs) funded under cooperative agreements with PRM and for other publicly funded benefits.

59. (U) If the host government cannot or will not protect the individual from involuntary repatriation and UNHCR is unable to intervene, and post believes that the person may qualify as a refugee, post should contact PRM/A for guidance on how to proceed.


60. (S/NF) Foreign nationals may also travel to the United States pursuant to the Secretary of Homeland Security's parole authority under Section 212(d)(5) of the INA. Parole may be granted based on humanitarian or significant public benefit grounds. Authority over humanitarian parole requests rests with DHS/USCIS/RAIO/HAB. Authority over Significant Public Benefit Parole (SPBP) rests with DHS/ICE. DHS/ICE/OIA-LEPB has developed guidelines in consultation with the Department for the processing of SPBP cases. Guidelines for both types of parole are contained in Ref H.

61. (S/NF) Use of parole for a walk-in may be warranted in extraordinary cases, such as when no other resolution appears feasible and a walk-in is of special interest to the United States, when a walk-in is in immediate danger, or when the case is politically sensitive. If post wishes to pursue parole for a walk-in, it must submit a request by telegram, slugged for INR/CCS, CA/VO/F/P, DRL/MLGA, P, and the appropriate regional bureau. An info copy should go to the appropriate DHS bureau. The telegram must provide justification for the request; include a certification by the COM or the Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) that the information provided is complete and accurate; and identify all interested agencies at post that were involved in reviewing and endorsing the request. A "CLASS" name check must be completed, and all required Security Advisory Opinion requests (SAOs) must be submitted. The results of the "CLASS" name check should be indicated in the cable.

62. (U) All financial arrangements for parolees must be made in advance. Post should not make any guarantees of such assistance, but should maintain a list of possible local sponsors that might be willing to assist (e.g., church groups or social service agencies in the United States), to contact in urgent situations if the parolee first agrees and signs a statement authorizing disclosure of his/her identity and situation to persons outside the U.S. Government. In some cases the Department may also be able to help by contacting private organizations in the United States to assist parolees upon arrival.


63. (S/NF) For the purpose of this telegram, the term "defector" refers to a person of any nationality (usually from a country whose interests are hostile or inimical to those of the United States) who has escaped from the control of their home country and is of special interest to the U.S. Government. Defector cases generally are handled under parole procedures. The GRPO will work out these arrangements with DHS/ICE and/or post's consular section once Washington's approval is obtained. The LEGATT should be notified of defector status as soon as practicable.


64. (S/NF) If the appropriate agencies decide that a walk-in should be allowed to travel to the United States (in any of the capacities described above), transportation out of the host country and to the United States must be arranged. Transportation out of friendly countries should not pose a problem. Post should take appropriate steps, in coordination with the host government, to ensure that the individual is permitted to travel and protected from possible adverse actions (e.g., by their country of nationality). If the individual lacks means to pay for transportation, post should consult with the Department regarding options. Approved refugees are eligible for a transportation loan administered by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) (the recipient will be responsible for eventual repayment). In exceptional circumstances, USG-funded transportation assistance for parolees may also be possible through IOM. Requests for such assistance should be sent to the Department (specifically PRM/A) for consideration.

65. (S/NF) In unfriendly countries, transportation out of the country may prove impossible or impractical. In such cases, the individual should be informed that if he/she makes their way to a more friendly country, the United States will consider them for admission. To the extent possible without compromising the confidentiality of the individual's request, post should monitor the situation and ensure that, if the individual leaves the country, he/she is met by USG or UNHCR officials at the first possible transit point.

66. (U) Minimize considered. CLINTON

US embassy cables: Washington calls for intelligence on top UN officials

  1. The state department asks US diplomats around the world and at UN heaquarters to provide detailed technical information, including passwords and personal encryption keys for communications networks used by UN officials. It also wants to know about potential links between UN organisations and terrorists, and any corruption in the UN. Key passage highlighted in yellow.

  2. Read related article
Friday, 31 July 2009, 20:24
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 24 STATE 080163
EO 12958 DECL: 07/31/2034
REF: STATE 048489

1. (S/NF) This cable provides the full text of the new National HUMINT Collection Directive (NHCD) on the United Nations (paragraph 3-end) as well as a request for continued DOS reporting of biographic information relating to the United Nations (paragraph 2).

A. (S/NF) The NHCD below supercedes the 2004 NHCD and reflects the results of a recent Washington review of reporting and collection needs focused on the United Nations. The review produced a comprehensive list of strategic priorities (paragraph 3) and reporting and collection needs (paragraph 4) intended to guide participating USG agencies as they allocate resources and update plans to collect information on the United Nations. The priorities should also serve as a useful tool to help the Embassy manage reporting and collection, including formulation of Mission Strategic Plans (MSPs).

B. (S/NF) This NHCD is compliant with the National Intelligence Priorities Framework (NIPF), which was established in response to NSPD-26 of February 24, 2003. If needed, GRPO can provide further background on the NIPF and the use of NIPF abbreviations (shown in parentheses following each sub-issue below) in NHCDs.

C. (S/NF) Important information often is available to non-State members of the Country Team whose agencies participated in the review of this National HUMINT Collection Directive. COMs, DCMs, and State reporting officers can assist by coordinating with other Country Team members to encourage relevant reporting through their own or State Department channels.

2. (S/NF) State biographic reporting:

A. (S/NF) The intelligence community relies on State reporting officers for much of the biographical information collected worldwide. Informal biographic reporting via email and other means is vital to the community's collection efforts and can be sent to the INR/B (Biographic) office for dissemination to the IC.

B. (S/NF) Reporting officers should include as much of the following information as possible when they have information relating to persons linked to : office and

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organizational titles; names, position titles and other information on business cards; numbers of telephones, cell phones, pagers and faxes; compendia of contact information, such as telephone directories (in compact disc or electronic format if available) and e-mail listings; internet and intranet "handles", internet e-mail addresses, web site identification-URLs; credit card account numbers; frequent flyer account numbers; work schedules, and other relevant biographical information.

3. (S/NF) Priority issues and issues outline:

A. Key Near-Term Issues 1) Darfur/Sudan (FPOL-1) 2) Afghanistan/Pakistan (FPOL-1) 3) Somalia (FPOL-1) 4) Iran (FPOL-1) 5) North Korea (FPOL-1)

B. Key Continuing Issues 1) UN Security Council Reform (FPOL-1) 2) Iraq (FPOL-1) 3) Middle East Peace Process (FPOL-1) 4) Human Rights and War Crimes (HRWC-3) 5) UN Humanitarian and Complex Emergency Response (HREL-3) 6) Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDN-5H) 7) Terrorist Threat to UN Operations (TERR-5H) 8) Burma (FPOL-1)

C. UN Peace and Peacebuilding Operations 1) Africa (FPOL-1) 2) Outside Africa (FPOL-1) 3) Policy Issues (FPOL-1)

D. UN Security Council 1) Procedures and Dynamics (FPOL-1) 2) Sanctions (FPOL-1)

E. UN Management 1) UN Leadership Dynamics (FPOL-1) 2) Budget and Management Reform (FPOL-1)

F. UN General Assembly Tactics and Voting Blocs (FPOL-1)

G. Other Substantive Issues 1) Food Security (FOOD-3) 2) Climate Change, Energy, and Environment (ENVR-4) 3) Transnational Economic Issues (ECFS-4H) 4) Arms Control and Treaty Monitoring (ACTM-4) 5) Health Issues (HLTH-4) 6) Terrorism (TERR-5H) 7) Trafficking, Social, and Women's Issues (DEPS-5H)

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H. Intelligence and Security Topics 1) GRPO can provide text of this issue. 2) GRPO can provide text of this issue. 3) Foreign Nongovernmental Organizations (FPOL-1) 4) Telecommunications Infrastructure and Information Systems (INFR-5H)

15. Collection requirements and tasking

(Agriculture is the Department of Agriculture; Commerce is the Department of Commerce; DHS is the Department of Homeland Security; DIA/DH is Defense Intelligence Agency/Defense HUMINT; Energy is the Department of Energy; DNI/OSC is the Open Source Center of the Director of National Intelligence; FBI is the Federal Bureau of Investigation; HHS is the Department of Health and Human Services; Navy is the Navy HUMINT element; NCS/CS is the CIA's Clandestine Service; OSC/MSC is the Map Services Center of OSC; State is the Department of State; TAREX (Target Exploitation) collects information using HUMINT Methods in support of NSA's requirements; Treasury is the Department of Treasury; USAID is the U.S. Agency for International Development; USSS is the U.S. Secret Service; USTR is the U.S. Trade Representative; WINPAC is the Weapons Intelligence, Nonproliferation, and Arms Control Center.)

A. Key Near-Term Issues

1) Darfur/Sudan (FPOL-1). -- Views of United Nations (UN) member states on contributing troops and air transportation equipment, such as helicopters, to the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) and the African Union (AU)-UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID). -- Details of deployments of troop contributor countries to UNMIS/UNAMID. -- Details on actions and views of UN personnel deployed in UNMIS/UNAMID. -- Views of UNSC members on the success or failure of UNMIS/UNAMID. -- Operational plans of UNMIS/UNAMID from both the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations in New York, and UNMIS/UNAMID in Sudan. -- Details of diplomatic engagement between UNMIS/UNAMID Special Envoys for the Darfur Peace Process in Sudan, and the Sudanese government or Darfur rebel groups. -- Views of member states on UN activities in Sudan (including Darfur). -- Divisions between UN member and UN Secretariat assessments of the situation on the ground as it affects UN action.

Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica, Croatia, Egypt, Ethiopia, France, Indonesia, Japan, Libya, Mexico, Nigeria, Russia, Rwanda, Sudan, Turkey, Uganda,

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Vietnam International Organizations: AU, European Union (EU), UN

2) Afghanistan/Pakistan (FPOL-1). -- Plans and intentions of key UN leaders and member states regarding the ongoing operations of the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), including force protection in Afghanistan. -- Information on plans and intentions of UN leadership or member states affecting elections in Afghanistan. -- Reactions to and assessments of security threats directed at the UN or aid personnel attempting to render humanitarian assistance. -- Plans and intentions of key member states and Secretariat leadership concerning Afghan political and economic reconstruction, including efforts to combat warlords and drug trafficking. -- Afghan, Pakistani and Iranian intentions or reluctance to secure and safeguard UN and nongovernmental organization (NGO) personnel (international as well as locally-hired staff).

Countries: Afghanistan, Austria, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica, Croatia, France, Iran, Japan, Libya, Mexico, Pakistan, Russia, Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam Terrorist Groups: Taliban International Organizations: EU, UN, World Bank

3) Somalia (FPOL-1). -- UN plans and potential to expand, reinforce, or replace the UN Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) and African Union (AU) Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). -- Plans and intentions of UN leadership, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, and member states to deploy a UN-led maritime force to monitor piracy off the coast of Somalia. -- Willingness of member states to pledge troops or air transport to a possible UN or multinational force in Somalia. -- Views of Somali population on the deployment of a UN or multinational peacekeeping force in Somalia. -- Details of diplomatic engagement between UN envoys and Somali government or Somali opposition officials. -- Information on World Food Program activities in Somalia. -- Details of UN Development Program (UNDP)-Somalia training Transitional Federal Government police officers and Alliance for the Reliberation of Somalia officials in the Joint Security Force.

Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, China, Costa Rica, Croatia, Ethiopia, France, Japan, Libya, Mexico, Russia, Somalia, Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam International Organizations: AU, EU, NATO, UN

4) Iran (FPOL-1). -- Plans and intentions of the UN Secretary General (SYG),

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Secretariat staff, or member states to address efforts by Iran to develop, test, or proliferate nuclear weapons. -- Positions and responses of member states to future International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA) Director General reports on Iran,s Implementation of Safeguards and relevant provisions of UN Security Council (UNSC) resolutions. -- Specific plans and activities of the UK, France, Germany (EU-3), and Russia with respect to IAEA policy toward Iran. -- Plans and intentions of key UN leaders and member states, especially Russia and China, regarding human rights in Iran, sanctions on Iran, Iran,s arming of HAMAS and Hizballah, and Iran,s candidacy for UN leadership positions. -- Plans and intentions of Perm 5, other key member states, coalition partners, and key Secretariat officials concerning sanctions against Iran. -- Member support/opposition/subversion of US positions regarding Iranian sanctions. -- Iranian diplomatic efforts with the IAEA and UN member states to avoid passage of additional sanctions and effective implementation of existing sanctions, as well as its efforts to end UNSC involvement in Iran's nuclear program by returning Iran's nuclear file to the IAEA. -- Information on Iran,s activities as chair of the UNDP and within the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). -- Development and democratization activities of the UNDP in Iran; details about the UNDP Resident Coordinator,s relationship with Iranian officials.

Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica, Croatia, France, Germany, Indonesia, Iran, Japan, Libya, Mexico, Russia, Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam Terrorist Groups: HAMAS, Hizballah (Lebanese) International Organizations: EU, IAEA, UN Non-State Entities: West Bank and Gaza Strip

5) North Korea (FPOL-1). -- Plans and intentions of UNSC members, especially the P-5, to consider additional resolutions against North Korea and/or sanctions under existing resolutions. -- Information on the plans and actions of UNSC members to address efforts by North Korea to develop, test, or proliferate nuclear weapons. -- UN views on food aid to North Korea, designating it as a nation in famine, and misuse of aid. -- North Korean delegation views and activities; instructions/plans of delegation officials on North Korean WMD-related issues. -- Development and democratization activities of the UNDP in North Korea. -- Details about the UNDP Resident Coordinator,s relationship with North Korean officials. -- Biographic and biometric information on ranking North Korean diplomats.

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Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, Burma, China, Costa Rica, Croatia, France, Japan, Libya, Mexico, North Korea, Russia, Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam International Organizations: EU, IAEA, UN

B. Key Continuing Issues

1) UN Security Council Reform (FPOL-1). -- Positions, attitudes, and divisions among member states on UN Security Council (UNSC) reform. -- Views, plans and intentions of Perm 5 and other member states on the issue of UNSC enlargement, revision of UNSC procedures or limitation of Perm 5 privileges. -- International deliberations regarding UNSC expansion among key groups of countries: self-appointed frontrunners for permanent UNSC membership Brazil, Germany, India, and Japan (the Group of Four or G-4); the Uniting for Consensus group (especially Mexico, Italy, and Pakistan) that opposes additional permanent UNSC seats; the African Group; and the EU, as well as key UN officials within the Secretariat and the UN General Assembly (UNGA) Presidency. -- Willingness of member states to implement proposed reforms. -- Reactions of UN senior leadership towards member recommendations for UNSC reform.

Countries: Austria, Brazil, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica, Croatia, France, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, Libya, Mexico, Pakistan, Russia, Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam International Organizations: AU, EU, UN

2) Iraq (FPOL-1). -- Plans and intentions of the Perm 5, other key member states, coalition partners, and key Secretariat officials concerning Iraqi political and economic reconstruction, the UN Assistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI), and internal Iraqi boundaries. -- Plans and intentions of the International Organization for Migration to assist with the reintegration of internally displaced persons and refugees. -- Extent to which member states will support or subvert US positions regarding Iraqi objectives, including reconstruction efforts. -- Information on plans and intentions of the SYG, Secretariat staff, or member states affecting elections in Iraq. -- Iraqi actions to convert UNAMI to a Chapter 6 mission. -- Iraqi attitudes toward the UN. -- Reactions to and assessments of security threats directed at the UN or aid personnel attempting to render humanitarian assistance.

Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica, Croatia, France, Iraq, Japan, Libya, Mexico, Russia, Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam

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Terrorist Groups: Insurgents in Iraq, Iraqi Shia Militants International Organizations: EU, UN, World Bank

3) Middle East Peace Process (FPOL-1). -- Details on views, plans and intentions of key Secretariat decision-makers, member states and influential blocs and coalitions on UN engagement and role in the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP), including implementation of the roadmap. -- Indications that a UNGA special session on the Middle East might be reconvened. -- Developments within the UN system that would further the Arab-Israeli peace process. -- Details about Quartet (EU, UN, US, and Russia) MEPP plans and efforts, including private objectives behind proposals and envoy negotiating strategies. -- Strategy and plans of SYG special envoy regarding US positions, Quartet plans, and other (EU, Russia, UK) special envoys. -- Indications member states or donor countries might scale back UN peacekeeping presence in or aid donations to the Middle East. -- Plans of the SYG or member states to pressure the US on the MEPP. -- Views, plans and tactics of the Palestinian Authority, including its representative to the UN, to gain support in the UNSC, UNGA, or UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) for its strategies and positions on Palestinian-Israeli issues, including from Russia and EU countries, especially France, Germany, and UK. -- Views of Secretary General,s Special Envoy and UNSC on possible settlement of the Shab'a Farms dispute to include Syria/Lebanon border demarcation. -- Secretariat views regarding water management as part of the Middle East Peace Process, including domestic and regional competition for allocation. -- Quartet views on Syria's policies and approach toward Israel and Palestinians and on Syrian motives behind and efforts to subvert or support Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. -- UN efforts to influence negotiating positions on territorial boundaries, water resources and management, and right of return. -- Views, plans and tactics of HAMAS to gain support in the UNSC or UNGA for its strategies and positions on HAMAS-Israeli issues, and on HAMAS-Palestinian Authority issues, including from Russia, China, Iran, and EU countries, especially France, Germany, and the UK. -- Information on UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) activities in Gaza, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, and the West Bank, and its relations with HAMAS/Hizballah. -- Plans and intentions of member states to support/oppose US priority to reduce the number of Middle East resolutions.

Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica,

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Croatia, Egypt, France, Germany, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Mexico, Spain, Syria, Russia, Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam Terrorist Groups: HAMAS, Hizballah (Lebanese) International Organizations: EU, UN Non-State Entities: Palestinian Authority, West Bank and Gaza Strip

4) Human Rights and War Crimes (HRWC-3). -- Plans and policies of UN leaders, member states, and foreign NGOs to promote human rights. -- Plans and intentions of member states toward the International Criminal Court (ICC), International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, the Special Court for Sierra Leone, and other UN-related courts and tribunals dealing with human rights issues. -- Plans and intentions of UNHRC members to support or oppose US policies in the UNHRC. -- Views of UNSC and other member states on Zimbabwe,s government policies on human rights, humanitarian assistance, democracy, and candidacy for any UN leadership positions. -- Views and intentions of UNSC, UN human rights entities, and members regarding Sri Lankan government policies on human rights and humanitarian assistance; UN views about appointing a Special Envoy for Sri Lanka. -- Plans and perceptions of member states toward establishment of new measures to prevent genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and other systematic human rights abuses. -- Plans and intentions of member states toward proposals and resolutions supported by the US or like-minded states, including those advancing democracy; women's rights, particularly implementation of UNSC Resolutions 1325 and 1820; those pertaining to children in armed conflict; or those condemning human rights abuses in individual countries. -- Information on reactions of member states to resolutions designed to promote democracy, human rights and reforms in the Muslim world. -- Perceived success or failure of abilities and priorities of the UN Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights (OHCHR), and efforts by member states to undermine OHCHR independence. -- Views, intentions and tactics of UNHRC members regarding reform and the role of the US. -- Member state support for/opposition to objectives of human rights, refugee, development, and emergency relief agencies. -- Plans and intentions of member states or UN Special Rapporteurs to press for resolutions or investigations into US counterterrorism strategies and treatment of detainees in Iraq, Afghanistan or Guantanamo. -- Degree of coordination by and among human rights agencies, especially between the UN Human Rights Council, the OHCHR,

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the UNGA Third Committee, the UN Economic and Social Council, and the International Labor Organization. -- Plans and agenda for upcoming UNGA Third Committee and UNHRC sessions and world human rights conferences, particularly plans by developing countries to stymie criticism of their human rights records through procedural motions or influencing votes. -- Plans of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) to sponsor resolutions or conventions in the UN restricting freedom of speech under the rubric of criminalizing "defamation of religion." -- Details of UNHRC and OHCHR budget shortfalls.

Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, Burma, Chad, China, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cuba, France, Georgia, Iraq, Japan, Lebanon, Libya, Mexico, North Korea, Russia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam, Zimbabwe International Organizations: AU, EU, Human Rights Entities and War Crimes Courts, ICC, OIC, UN

5) UN Humanitarian and Complex Emergency Response (HREL-3). -- Information on the planning and execution of responses to humanitarian emergencies by UN member states and Secretariat; indications US assistance may be requested. -- Efforts of UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), World Food Program (WFP), UN Development Program (UNDP), UN Children's Fund (UNICEF), World Health Organization (WHO), and other UN entities to respond to and to coordinate activities in humanitarian or refugee crises, including environmental disasters. -- Views of UN Secretariat, UNSC members, and key member states on UNRWA. -- Details on effectiveness of UNHCR and OCHA leadership. -- Information on ability of UN to gain/not gain humanitarian access to troubled areas, especially in light of security concerns. -- Location of humanitarian facilities, including GPS coordinates, and number of personnel. -- Details of friction between UNHCR, OCHA and UN Security Coordinator Headquarters and field offices. -- Level of cooperation and coordination or lack thereof between UN aid agencies and non-UN aid programs. -- Interoperability and willingness to work with US coalitions in humanitarian assistance operations; willingness to provide support despite security threats. -- Indications of donor fatigue. -- Status of and member support for/opposition to efforts by UNHCR to refocus organization's work and to redistribute programs to other agencies. -- Details on UNHCR funding shortfalls. -- Perceived ability of the UNDP to coordinate an effective UN presence in each country and to promote democratic

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governance. -- Plans and ability to care for and protect internally displaced persons. -- Communications and logistics problems.

Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica, Croatia, France, Japan, Libya, Mexico, Russia, Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam International Organizations: Economic-Societal Entities, Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), UN, World Health Organization

6) Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDN-5H). -- Plans and intentions of member states to address threats to international security from the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. -- Views of member states on tactical and substantive aspects of resolutions pertaining to missile proliferation, missile defense, nuclear disarmament, the IAEA, and Israel's nuclear program. -- Information from key Secretariat decision-makers, key IAEA Secretariat staff, member states, or influential blocs or groups, such as the Nonaligned Movement (NAM), the OIC, or the Group of 77 (G-77), on the role of the UN on nuclear proliferation or addressing the expansion of capabilities to produce or use weapons of mass destruction.

Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, Burma, China, Costa Rica, Croatia, France, Japan, Libya, Mexico, Russia, Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam International Organizations: EU, IAEA, International Arms Control Organizations, OIC, UN

7) Terrorist Threat to UN Operations (TERR-5H). -- Plans and intentions of Secretariat and member states to respond to individuals affiliated with terrorist groups or state sponsors of terrorism threatening the safety or security of domestic and overseas UN personnel, facilities, protectees, or installations. -- Evidence of relationship or funding between UN personnel and/or missions and terrorist organizations. -- Debate in Secretariat, UNSC counterterrorism bodies (subcommittees), UN agencies and among member states about measures for funding of security for UN domestic and overseas facilities, operations, and personnel. -- Host-country intentions to secure and safeguard UN and NGO personnel. -- Reactions to and assessments of terrorist acts directed at the UN, UN personnel, UN protectees, or domestic and overseas UN installations, including foreign UN missions in New York. -- Details of UN efforts to acquire, collect, assess and disseminate threat information within the US and overseas. -- Plans of UN security offices to upgrade security at UN

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domestic and overseas UN facilities.

Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica, Croatia, France, Japan, Libya, Mexico, Russia, Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam International Organizations: UN

8) Burma (FPOL-1). -- Views of UNSC and member states on Burma,s policies and actions on human rights, humanitarian assistance, democracy, and attempts to play a larger UN role. -- Plans and intentions of the Special Adviser to the UN Secretary General on Burma regarding future interaction with Burma and engagement with UN member states. -- Plans and intentions of the SYG on Burma; level of trust in his Special Adviser. -- Views of Burmese officials on the SYG, on his Special Adviser on Burma, and on key countries in the UN. -- Role of the UN in Burmese elections. -- Development and democratization activities of UNDP in Burma; details about the UNDP Resident Coordinator,s relationship with Burmese officials.

Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, Burma, China, Costa Rica, Croatia, France, Indonesia, Japan, Libya, Mexico, Russia, Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam International Organizations: EU, UN

C. UN Peace and Peacebuilding Operations.

1) Africa (FPOL-1). -- Plans and intentions of UN leaders and member states regarding peace operations, especially in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Somalia, Chad/Central African Republic, Burundi, Cote d,Ivoire, and Liberia. -- UN peacekeeping plans and intentions regarding military operations against rebels based in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. -- Early warning information available to the Secretariat on potential threats to peace and security. -- UN views on the role of AFRICOM in African conflict resolution and post-conflict capacity building. -- UN expectations of US military involvement in African peacekeeping missions and how this may influence UN willingness to establish, curb, or end missions. -- Extent to which UN peace operations in Africa are straining the resources of the UN and member states; impact of current operations on future operations and readiness. -- UN views on peacekeeping mission creep and pressures to expand the UN role in African conflict zones, either in the form of more comprehensive "peacemaking" mission mandates or in areas where security threats demand more aggressive and timely UN-led multilateral intervention. -- Details on views of the UN Department of Peacekeeping

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Operations on operational plans, including the ability of the UN and its member states to build capacity in Africa, including by working with the AU or other regional organizations and NGOs. -- Efforts by China, France, Iran, and others to gain influence in Africa via UN peace operations. -- Information on extent of support and capabilities for peace operations by the AU and the Economic Community of Western African States (ECOWAS). -- Official stance on deploying HIV positive troops and actual practice. -- Degree to which official peacekeeping reporting matches unofficial communications of events; views on those discrepancies. -- Views of African states that host peacekeepers regarding UN peacekeeping troops and troop contributing countries. -- Attitudes and intentions of Ghana and Rwanda concerning UN peace operations in Africa and perception of their relative ability to contribute to such efforts. -- Attitudes of other African States to Ghana/Rwanda participation and leadership.

Countries: Austria, Bangladesh, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, China, Congo, Cote d,Ivoire, Democratic Republic, Costa Rica, Croatia, Egypt, Ethiopia, France, India, Japan, Jordan, Liberia, Libya, Mexico, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, Russia, Rwanda, Somalia, South Africa, Turkey, Uganda, Uruguay, Vietnam, Zimbabwe International Organizations: AU, EU, ICC, NATO, UN Non-State Entities: Lord,s Resistance Army

2) Outside Africa (FPOL-1). -- Plans and intentions of UN leaders and member states regarding ongoing peace operations outside Africa. -- Willingness of UN leaders and member states to support UN peacekeeping efforts and utilize preventive diplomacy in areas of potential conflict. -- Views of member states on and plans to respond to the US-backed G-8 plan to expand global peace operations capabilities. -- Views and positions of key member states and Secretariat toward proposed resolutions, mandates, peacekeeping issues, and US-sponsored initiatives. -- Information on whether member states will utilize references to the ICC to condition support for peace operations. -- Information on deployment benchmarks, pre-deployment screening, and supply and logistic shortfalls in peace operations. -- Ability to obtain pledges and deploy capable military forces, including surge capabilities. -- Views of UNSC members, the Secretariat, and key member states on Haiti,s government policies and actions on human rights, humanitarian assistance, and democracy.

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-- Views and positions of UNSC members, the Secretariat, and key member states regarding the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) and peacekeeping in Lebanon.

Countries: Austria, Brazil, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica, Croatia, France, Georgia, Haiti, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Lebanon, Libya, Mexico, Nepal, Russia, Spain, Turkey, Uganda, Uruguay, Vietnam International Organizations: AU, EU, ICC, NATO, UN

3) Policy Issues (FPOL-1). -- UN member views, plans, and intentions concerning the capability of the UN to organize, lead, and carry out new, complex military operations and civilian police operations. -- Information on Secretariat or member views on or initiatives for peace operations reform. -- Information on the appointment of SYG special representatives for new peace or political operations. -- Scope, objectives, command structures, rules of engagement, and threat environment for proposed peacekeeping activities, including transportation and communications infrastructures and any available maps. -- Types, number, and capabilities of troops, equipment, and materiel that countries are willing to contribute. -- Information on interoperability of equipment and material available for logistic support. -- Information on turf battles between the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Department of Field Support, and Department of Political Affairs over control of peace operations. -- Information on turf battles between logistic and military sides of peace operations. -- UN member views on reform of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. -- Information on troop contributing countries' tendency to follow orders given by troop contributing country commanders vice UN field commanders. -- Influence of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and the Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees (UNCHR) on including human rights and refugee concerns within peace operations mandates. -- Host government views and concerns about UN policies toward that country. -- Influence of UN security coordinator on operational planning; field personnel reaction to UN security directives. -- Capability/plans for Standby High-Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG) deployments. -- Details on peacekeeper abuse of women and children; national and UN responses. -- Changes in ability of member states, especially member states of EU, AU and ECOWAS, to contribute troops to peace operations, including for economic, social, and operational reasons. -- Details on contributions of member states (in kind,

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personnel, or financial).

Countries: Austria, Bangladesh, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica, Croatia, Ethiopia, France, Ghana, India, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Libya, Mexico, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, Russia, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Turkey, Uganda, Uruguay, Vietnam International Organizations: AU, EU, UN

D. UN Security Council

1) Procedures and Dynamics (FPOL-1). -- Plans, intentions, and agendas of UNSC members and Secretariat on issues that come before the UNSC, especially voting intentions of UNSC members and priorities or frictions among the Perm 5. -- Plans and intentions of UNSC members to support or oppose US policies in the UNSC. -- Specific views and positions of key member states on US-sponsored initiatives, initiatives with implications for the US, and other proposed resolutions and mandates. -- Plans, intentions, views, positions, lobbying, and tactics of regional groups, blocs, or coalitions on issues before the UNSC, especially those that do not include the US (particularly the Africa Group, AU, EU, NAM, G-77, Rio Group, Arab League, the OIC, and the Group of Latin America and Caribbean Countries (GRULAC). -- Differences in the positions of member states, differences between UN missions and their capitals, internal procedures for determining voting instructions, and voting instructions to delegations. -- Priorities, plans, and intentions of new member states joining the UNSC, and influences on them by regional groups, blocs, or coalitions on issues before the UNSC, especially those that do not include the US (particularly AU, EU, NAM, G-77, Rio Group, Arab League, and the OIC). -- Plans and intentions of member states of regional groups regarding UNSC candidacy. -- Biographic and biometric information on UNSC Permanent Representatives, information on their relationships with their capitals.

Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica, Croatia, France, Japan, Libya, Mexico, Russia, Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam International Organizations: AU, EU, OIC, UN

2) Sanctions (FPOL-1). -- UNSC member plans, intentions, and views toward sanctions issues, especially during negotiations of sanctions resolutions. -- Willingness of and efforts by UN member states to violate sanctions. -- Perceived and actual impact of sanctions on target

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governments, individuals, entities, as well as on civil population. -- Plans, intentions, and agendas of UNSC sanctions committee members. -- Plans, intentions, and agendas of UNSC sanctions committee expert groups and their ability to support sanctions monitoring. -- Pressure to limit scope and length of new sanctions, especially from coalitions and regional groups. -- Views and actions of the Secretariat or member states with regard to sanctions, including to bolster UN ability to support sanctions implementation and to address violations. -- Views of target government on sanctions imposed on it.

Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica, Croatia, France, Japan, Libya, Mexico, Russia, Sierra Leone, Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam International Organizations: EU, UN

E. UN Management

1) UN Leadership Dynamics (FPOL-1). -- SYG's management and decision-making style, and his influence on the Secretariat. -- Plans, measures and efforts undertaken by the SYG and subordinates on US political and bureaucratic objectives for UN management. -- Role and influence of Secretariat and other key officials with SYG and other UN system agencies. -- Views of and brokering by key officials on major issues. -- Changes in and appointment and selection process for key officials of Secretariat, specialized agency, committee, commission, and program officials in New York, Geneva, Vienna, and other UN system cities, to include special assistants and chiefs of staff. -- Personalities, biographic and biometric information, roles, effectiveness, management styles, and influence of key UN officials, to include under secretaries, heads of specialized agencies and their chief advisers, top SYG aides, heads of peace operations and political field missions, including force commanders. -- Relations between key UN officials and member states. -- Views of member states on the next SYG race, to include preferred candidates and candidates lacking UN member support. -- Views of UNSC members and other member states on Cuban, Iranian, or Syrian candidacy for any UN leadership positions.

Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cuba, France, Japan, Libya, Mexico, Russia, Syria, Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam International Organizations: UN

2) Budget and Management Reform (FPOL-1). -- Plans, measures and efforts undertaken by the SYG and

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subordinates on US political and bureaucratic objectives for UN management. -- Perceptions of member states of the effectiveness of the Office for Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) and the Joint Inspection Unit (JIU) to combat waste, fraud, mismanagement, and corruption. -- Effectiveness of the OIOS, in light of the review of the OIOS mandate. -- Plans and moves to implement OIOS recommendations. -- SYG's view of the role of the OIOS. -- Secretariat attitudes toward and evidence of corruption in UN agencies and programs, and willingness to implement measures to reduce corruption. -- Plans and intentions of UN member states or the Secretariat to address corruption issues at the UN and UN agencies. -- Plans and intentions of UNDP Executive Board members to push for or block management reform proposals. -- Plans and intentions of UNDP Executive Board members or senior UNDP managers to address potential or actual cases of corruption or mismanagement by field missions, including efforts to cover up waste, fraud, or abuse. -- Internal complaints by UNDP staff about waste, fraud, or abuse and efforts by UNDP management to respond to them. -- Plans and intentions of Board members, such as Iran, to push for increased UNDP funding for programs in their own countries or those of their friends. -- Degree of independence from UN headquarters of UNDP Resident Coordinators in the field and perceptions of field staff on UN aid consolidation reforms under the "One UN" Program. -- Efforts by the G-77 Board members to develop common group platforms, especially on budget and management reform issues. -- Developments in the implementation of the performance based personnel system and contractor reform. -- Plans, intentions, and agendas of UN specialized agency executive committees. -- Impact and effectiveness of whistle-blowing provisions on the UN reform process. -- Attitudes of UN staff and member states towards extending a common whistle-blower protection program to all UN funds and programs. -- Indications of pressure by member states or groups to increase or control growth in the budget. -- Secretariat and member attitudes towards changes in the scale of assessments. -- Options under consideration to resolve financial problems. -- SYG views on and plans for responding to Government Accountability Office reports calling on the UN to more effectively implement results-based budgeting, and make further progress on management reform. -- Secretariat and member attitudes and plans to improve the UN budget process. -- Status and use of advanced information systems to

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streamline UN processes.

Countries: Argentina, Austria, Brazil, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cuba, Egypt, France, Japan, Libya, Mexico, Russia, South Africa, Syria, Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam International Organizations: UN

F. UN General Assembly Tactics and Voting Blocs (FPOL-1). -- Plans, intentions, views, positions, lobbying, and tactics of regional groups, blocs, or coalitions on issues before the General Assembly, especially those that do not include the US, i.e., the Africa Group, AU, EU, NAM, G-77, Rio Group, Arab League, the OIC, and the GRULAC. -- Details of bargaining on votes or candidacies and attempts to marginalize or undermine proposed or planned US positions or policy initiatives. -- Information on the EU agenda in the UNGA, especially as it relates to US priorities in the First, Third, and Fifth Committees. -- Information on efforts by the EU or other member states to secure additional voting rights in the UN and its specialized agencies. -- Lobbying by member states for committee membership assignments or vice presidencies. -- Information on current and likely future leadership of regional groups, blocs, and coalitions. -- Differences over positions between UN missions and their respective capitals. -- Voting instructions to delegations on key resolutions. -- Plans, intentions, and agendas of key committee chairs; member views of issues that come before these committees. -- Efforts of Third World countries to moderate, via NAM and G-77, Third World positions on development, defamation of religion, or human rights issues. -- Intentions of UN members to use non-UN bodies and working groups to bypass perceived UN bureaucracy. -- Perceptions of member states of the viability and potential impact of the US-backed Democracy Caucus. -- Biographical and biometric information on key NAM/G-77/OIC Permanent Representatives, particularly China, Cuba, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, South Africa, Sudan, Uganda, Senegal, and Syria; information on their relationships with their capitals.

Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cuba, Egypt, France, Indonesia, Japan, Libya, Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, Russia, Senegal, South Africa, Sudan, Syria, Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam International Organizations: AU, EU, OIC, UN

G. Other Substantive Issues

1) Food Security (FOOD-3). -- Status and proposals related to the UN Comprehensive

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Framework for Action to address the global food crisis. -- WFP activities and proposals related to reforming donor food aid policies and establishing a new standing global fund to address regularly occurring food crises. -- WFP and FAO plans and proposals regarding the impact on food prices and food security of the growing use of ethanol and biofuels. -- Internal UN responses to international calls for reform of FAO and WFP.

Countries: Afghanistan, Austria, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica, Croatia, Ethiopia, France, Haiti, Iraq, Japan, Libya, Mexico, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, Somalia, Sudan, Thailand, Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam, Zimbabwe International Organizations: FAO, UN, World Animal Health Organization Non-State Entities: Palestinian Authority, West Bank and Gaza Strip

2) Climate Change, Energy, and Environment (ENVR-4). -- Country preparations for the December 2009 Copenhagen UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Meeting. -- Developments related to other UNFCCC meetings and discussions on a successor agreement to the Kyoto Protocol. -- Perceptions of key negotiators on US positions in environmental negotiations. -- Developments on the Montreal Protocol, including reactions to US efforts to limit hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs). -- Indications that member states working through the UN and its specialized agencies are/are not fostering environmental cooperation, partnerships and capacity building between and among member states and regional and sub-regional organizations. -- Monitoring of and compliance with UN-sponsored environmental treaties; evidence of treaty circumvention. -- Information on adherence to member states' own national environmental programs, including protection, monitoring, and cleanup efforts. -- Efforts by treaty secretariats to influence treaty negotiations or compliance. -- Information on the Convention on Biological Diversity, particularly on access, benefit sharing and bio-safety. -- Information on the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, including potential efforts to modify or amend its provisions. -- Information on excessive maritime claims, including those relating to ridges. -- Information on efforts to develop a mechanism to add chemicals to the list of persistent organic pollutants. -- Information and perceptions on the strategic approach to international chemicals management, especially efforts of the EU's management program. -- Information on participation in and compliance with the UN Basel Convention. -- Status of efforts to set standards to promote

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environmental protection, including protection of forests, desertification, and invasive or endangered species. -- Efforts within the UN to protect water resources, and to promote development of alternative sources of energy.

Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica, Croatia, France, Japan, Libya, Mexico, Russia, Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam International Organizations: EU, UN

3) Transnational Economic Issues (ECFS-4H). -- Information on efforts by UN member states or organizations to promote or obstruct regulatory reform, including banking and financial reforms, transparency, international law, trade, development, and foreign direct investment to reflect the Monterrey anti-poverty consensus and the Millennium Development Goals. -- Plans, intentions, and tactics of the UNGA President regarding international financial problems; views of member states regarding these plans. -- Plans and intentions of member states to support US priorities related to economic freedom and promotion of democracy. -- Secretariat or member plans to develop multilateral economic, trade, or development agreements impinging on US interests. -- Efforts by member states and the Secretariat to reconcile international differences over globalization, especially the perceived impact of globalization on human rights, labor, and environmental issues. -- Member positions on UN decisions, plans, and activities concerning environmentally sustainable economic growth through market economies, free trade, private investment, and efficient multilateral development assistance. -- Efforts to expand the global compact involving corporations committed to observing human rights, environmental, and labor standards. -- SYG's views and statements on trade issues and efforts to influence future World Trade Organization rounds. -- Plans and intentions of UN member states that may impact freedom of navigation. -- Information on international taxation initiatives.

Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica, Croatia, France, Japan, Libya, Mexico, Russia, Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam International Organizations: EU, FAO, International Financial Institutions and Infrastructures, UN, World Bank, World Trade Organization

4) Arms Control and Treaty Monitoring (ACTM-4). -- Plans, tactics, timetables, and draft proposals for the Eighth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), and especially

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information related to the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East and a Middle East Nuclear Weapons Free Zone initiative, from interested individual member states (especially China, Cuba, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Russia, and South Africa) and like-minded groups such as the NAM and the New Agenda Coalition (Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa, and Sweden). -- Member state views of the major problems facing the NPT; whether or under what conditions states would consider withdrawing from the NPT. -- Member views on and responses to US plans and policies on missile defense and positions on a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty, particularly those of Russia, China, and Pakistan. -- Information on IAEA plans for safeguards, international fuel banks, or other nuclear fuel supply arrangements, and meetings of the Board of Governors at the IAEA. -- Member views on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT); prospects for country ratifications and entry into force. -- Member plans for plenary meetings of the Nuclear Suppliers Group; views of the US-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative. -- Readiness of member states to reform the agenda of the UN General Assembly's First Committee; proposals prepared by member states for the First Committee. -- Views of key delegations on US proposals on land mines. -- Tactical and substantive information regarding periodic arms control meetings in New York, Geneva, Vienna and elsewhere, including the Biological Weapons Convention, the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) review process, UN experts group on missiles, and meetings on conventional arms. -- Plans and intentions of member states to introduce new arms control or proliferation prevention measures or make significant changes to existing agreements. - Member or Secretariat plans to address WMD proliferation, safeguards, arms control and disarmament, or other threat reduction efforts. -- Foreign attitudes on UN-sanctioned arms control negotiations. -- Biographic and biometric data on, and positions of key UN arms control interlocutors, especially candidates for the position of Director General of the IAEA, and the heads of other international institutions.

Countries: Austria, Brazil, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cuba, Egypt, France, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Japan, Libya, Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, Russia, South Africa, Sweden, Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam International Organizations: EU, IAEA, International Arms Control Organizations, NATO, OSCE, UN

5) Health Issues (HLTH-4). -- UN, WHO, and other international organizations,

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forecasts, expected impacts, plans, proposals, key studies, and reactions to major health crises and other health-related issues, including efforts on disease eradication, improving health standards and access to care and medicine, and programs to monitor and respond to emerging infectious disease outbreaks and other disasters or emergencies. -- Information on deliberations in the UN and other international health organizations on health issues and the policy positions and objectives of member states and key figures, including compromises, insertions, and items omitted in published declarations and studies. -- Information on international health organizations, relationships and interactions with countries and other organizations, including relationships with regional offices or subsidiaries. -- Details on limits and restrictions placed on international organizations to investigate reports of diseases that pose an international threat, including restrictions placed on the nationality of members of investigation teams. -- Details on disease transparency, particularly indications about inconsistent reporting of outbreaks to appropriate international organizations and delivery of specimens to WHO- and FAO-affiliated laboratories, and including discussions or agreements impacting the publicly disclosed occurrence of diseases. -- Details of discussions related to the accessibility of HIV/AIDS drugs (antiretroviral drugs or ARVs). -- Details related to the availability, accessibility, and regulation of health care, particularly medications, vaccines, and counterfeits. -- Member state attitudes toward maintenance of smallpox stocks. -- Information on global counterfeit medications to include surveillance, countermeasures, and research and development issues. -- Details on efforts to implement health-related Millennium Development Goals. -- Details on corruption in international health organizations or the corrupt use of goods and services provided for health issues by bilateral and multilateral donors and international health organizations, including WHO, UNAIDS, FAO, and the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria. -- Details on irregularities in Global Fund fundraising, spending, and treatment of whistle blowers. -- Personalities, biographic and biometric information, roles, effectiveness, management styles, and influence of key health officials, to include the Director General of the WHO, head of UNAIDS, the Pan American Health Organization, under Secretaries, heads of specialized agencies and their chief advisers, and top aides.

Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica, Croatia, France, Japan, Libya, Mexico, Russia, Turkey,

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Uganda, Vietnam International Organizations: EU, FAO, UN, World Animal Health Organization, WHO

6) Terrorism (TERR-5H). -- Information on plans and intentions of UN bodies and member states to respond to or address within UN fora the worldwide terrorist threat. -- Structure, plans and key figures of UN counterterrorism strategy. -- Information on plans and activities of UNSC,s four counterterrorism sub-bodies. -- Plans and intentions of member states to address terrorism by implementing anti-terrorism legislation as called for under resolutions, particularly as they relate to tracking financial transactions. -- Views of member states on US policy toward terrorism. -- Efforts of member states to support or oppose activities undertaken by UN specialized agencies such as the International Maritime Organization and the International Civil Aviation Organization to improve maritime and airline security. -- Information on UN support for technical assistance to member states to combat terrorism, particularly in Africa. -- Views of member states about inclusion or exclusion of terrorism against Israel in counterterrorism efforts and definition of terrorism. -- (For further requirements, see the NHCD on Terrorism Threats to US Interests at Home and Abroad, July 13, 2005.)

Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica, Croatia, France, Japan, Libya, Mexico, Russia, Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam International Organizations: UN

7) Trafficking, Social, and Women's Issues (DEPS-5H). -- Plans and intentions of member states to support or oppose US priority to combat trafficking and exploitation of men, women, and children. -- Member state perceptions of ability of UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) to follow through on strategies to support women and children through UN specialized bodies. -- Information on member efforts to combat organized crime, narcotics trafficking, and trafficking in persons. -- Plans and intentions of member states to address reproductive issues, including the aims of the EU vis-a-vis the US, GRULAC, Arab, and OIC nations. -- Member state perceptions or plans regarding efforts to reconcile religious differences worldwide. -- Information on reforms undertaken within the UN Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and future plans of the organization. -- Member views on education initiatives.

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Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica, Croatia, France, Japan, Libya, Mexico, Russia, Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam International Organizations: EU, OIC, UN

H. Intelligence and Security Topics

1) GRPO can provide text of this issue and related requirements.

2) GRPO can provide text of this issue and related requirements.

3) Foreign Nongovernmental Organizations (FPOL-1). -- Influence of key UN-affiliated foreign NGOs on UN decision-making. -- Efforts of foreign NGOs to undermine US policy initiatives. -- Foreign NGO role in, views toward, and influence on UN policies and activities on globalization, justice, human rights, the environment, and family/women/children/reproductive issues. -- Ability and capacity of foreign NGOs to assist refugees, displaced persons, and victims of disasters through the UNHCR and WFP. -- Ability and capacity of foreign NGOs to support the UN Environmental Program or national efforts with environmental protection, pollution monitoring, and cleanup efforts. -- Contacts between foreign NGOs and Secretariat staff that could involve sharing of confidential data. -- Foreign efforts to strip US or foreign NGOs of UN affiliation and to block US or foreign NGOs seeking UN affiliation. -- Efforts by member states-*particularly China, Cuba, Israel, Russia, and Islamic countries*-to obtain NGO affiliation for organizations supporting their policies. -- Efforts by organizations affiliated with terrorist organizations or foreign intelligence organizations to obtain NGO affiliation with the UN. -- Efforts by the EU through the Arhus convention to place NGOs on UN bureaus; reactions of member states to those efforts. -- Role of NGOs at the Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees (OHCR), OHCHR, and UNHRC in the Third Committee of the UNGA.

Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cuba, France, Japan, Libya, Mexico, Russia, Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam International Organizations: EU, OIC, UN

4) Telecommunications Infrastructure and Information Systems (INFR-5H). -- Current technical specifications, physical layout, and planned upgrades to telecommunications infrastructure and

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information systems, networks, and technologies used by top officials and their support staffs. -- Details on commercial and private VIP networks used for official communications, to include upgrades, security measures, passwords, personal encryption keys, and types of V P N versions used. -- Telephone numbers and e-mail addresses of key officials, as well as limited distribution telephone numbers/directories and public switched networks (PSTN) telephone directories; dialing numbers for voice, datalink, video teleconferencing, wireless communications systems, cellular systems, personal communications systems, and wireless facsimiles. -- Information on hacking or other security incidents involving UN networks. -- Key personnel and functions of UN entity that maintains UN communications and computer networks. -- Indications of IO">IO">IO/IW operations directed against the UN. -- Information about current and future use of communications systems and technologies by officials or organizations, including cellular phone networks, mobile satellite phones, very small aperture terminals (VSAT), trunked and mobile radios, pagers, prepaid calling cards, firewalls, encryption, international connectivity, use of electronic data interchange, Voice-over-Internet protocol (VoIP), Worldwide interoperability for microwave access (Wi-Max), and cable and fiber networks.

Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica, Croatia, France, Japan, Libya, Mexico, Russia, Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam International Organizations: UN CLINTON

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